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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper pertains to a line of research aimed at exploring the notions of agency and information flow in situa-
tions in which truth is socially constructed. Such situations are ubiquitous in the real world. A prime example is
the validity of contracts. Establishing that an agreement constitutes a valid contract appeals to notions, such as
legal competency and bona fide offers, which are inherently socially constructed. The ultimate way in which the
validity of a contract can be ascertained is for it to be tested in a court of law. In this last instance, the validity
of a contract is thus procedural, and may also admit of situations in which it is indeterminate, such as when the
court declares itself incompetent. These are features at odds with standard classical logic. Accommodating these
features within classical logic requires additional encoding mechanisms. The alternative is working with logics
which are specifically designed to accommodate these characteristics of socially constructed truth.
Examples of situations where truth is socially constructed are certainly not confined to contract law, but are
easy to find in many other contexts. These include establishing public opinion in a binding way like referendums,
establishing whether a certain item of clothing is fashionable, and determining the value of products in a market.
There is a large literature on logics which very adequately capture agency and information flow (see [Van11]
and references therein), but assume a notion of truth that is classical. There is therefore a need for a uniform
methodology for transferring these logics onto nonclassical bases. In [MPS14, KP13], a uniform methodology
is introduced for defining the nonclassical counterparts of dynamic epistemic logics. This methodology, further
pursued in [Riv14, BR15a, BvDF16], is grounded on semantics, and is based on the dual characterizations of the
transformations of models which interpret epistemic actions.
The present paper expands on [CFPT15] and applies the methodology of [MPS14, KP13] to obtain nonclassical
counterparts of probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic (PDEL) [Koo03, vBGK09]. We will focus specifically on the
intuitionistic environment as our case study. This environment allows for a finer-grained analysis when serving
as a base formore expressive formalisms such asmodal and dynamic logics. Indeed, the fact that the box-type and
the diamond-type modalities are no longer interdefinable makes several mutually independent choices possible
which cannot be disentangled in the classical setting. Moving to the intuitionistic environment also requires
the use of intuitionistic probability theory (cf. [AGM08, FGM17]) as the background framework for probabilistic
reasoning. From the point of view of applications this generalization is needed to account for situations in which
the probability of a certain proposition p is interpreted as an agent’s propensity to bet on p given some evidence
for or againstp. If there is little or no evidence for or againstp, it should be reasonable to attribute low probability
values to both p and ¬p, which is forbidden by classical probability theory (cf. [Wea03]).
Finally, these mathematical developments appear in tandem with interesting analyses on the philosophical
side of formal logic (e.g. [AP14]), exploring epistemic logic in an evidentialist key, which is congenial to the kind
of social situations targeted by our research programme.
Our methodology is based on the dual characterization of the product update construction for standard PDEL-
models as a certain construction transforming the complex algebras associated with a given model into the
complex algebra associated with the updated model. This dual characterization naturally generalizes to much
wider classes of algebras, which include arbitrary classical S5 algebras and certain monadic Heyting algebras.
As an application of this dual characterization, we introduce the axiomatization of the intuitionistic analogue
of PDEL semantically arising from this construction, and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to
the class of so called algebraic probabilistic epistemic models (see Definition 5.3).
Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we recall the definition of classical PDEL and its relational semantics.
We give an alternative presentation of the product update construction which consists in two steps, as done in
[KP13]. The two-step construction highlights the elements which will be key in the dualization. In Section 3, we
expand on the methodologymaking use of Stone duality. Section 4 is the main section, in which the construction
of the PDEL-updates on epistemic Heyting algebras is introduced. In Section 5, we define axiomatically the
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intuitionistic version of PDEL (IPDEL) and its interpretation on algebraic probabilistic epistemic models, and
discuss the proof of its soundness. In Section 6, we introduce the relational semantics of IPDEL. In Section 7, we
discuss the case study of a decision-making under uncertainty. In Section 8, we collect conclusions and further
directions. Appendix A collects some proofs of Section 4. Appendix B contains the proof of soundness of IPDEL
with respect to algebraic probabilistic epistemic models. Appendix C contains the proof of completeness of IPDEL
with respect to algebraic probabilistic epistemic models.
2 PDEL LANGUAGE AND UPDATES
In the present section, we report on the language of PDEL, and give an alternative, two-step account of the
product update construction on PDEL-models. This account is similar to the treatment of epistemic updates in
[MPS14, KP13], and as explained in Section 3, it lays the ground to the dualization procedure which motivates
the construction introduced in Section 4. The specific PDEL framework we report on shares common features
with those of [BCHS13, Ach14] and [vBGK09].
Structure of the section. In Section 2.1, we recall basic facts about probability theory, we present the syntax au
PDEL, the classical models and the classical event structures. In Section 2.2, we present the alternative construc-
tion for epistemic update of a PES-model by a probabilistic event structure. In Section 2.3 and 2.4 respectively,
we present the semantics and the axiomatisation of classical PDEL.
2.1 PDEL-formulas, event structures, and PES-models
In this section, we first recall basic facts about probability distributions and probability measures, then we intro-
duce the syntax and semantics of Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic (PDEL).
Remark 1. Given a finite set X , a probability distribution P over X is a map
P : X → [0, 1]
such that ∑
x ∈X
P(x) = 1.
Recall that a probability measure on PX can be defined as a map
µ : PX → [0, 1]
satisfying the following properties:
(1) µ(∅) = 0,
(2) µ(X ) = 1,
(3) for any A,B ⊆ X , we have µ(A ∪ B) = µ(A) + µ(B) − µ(A ∩ B).
The probability measure µ : PX → [0, 1] determined by the probability distribution P over X is defined as follows:
for any S ⊆ X ,
µ(S) :=
∑
x ∈S
P(x).
In the remainder of the paper, we fix a countable set AtProp of proposition letters p,q and a non-empty finite
set Ag of agents i . We let α1, ...,αn , β denote rational numbers.
Definition 2.1 (PDEL syntax). The set L of PDEL-formulas φ and the class of probabilistic event structures E
over L (see Theorem 2.4) are built by simultaneous recursion as follows:
φ ::= p | ⊥ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | φ → φ | ♦iφ | iφ | 〈E, e〉φ | [E, e]φ | (
n∑
k=1
αk µi (φ)) ≥ β,
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wherep ∈ AtProp, i ∈ Ag,α1, ...,αn , β are rational numbers, and the event structures E are such as in Theorem 2.4.
The connectives ⊤, ¬, and↔ are defined by the usual abbreviations.
Definition 2.2 (PES-model). A probabilistic epistemic state model (PES-model) is a structure
M =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
such that
• S is a finite set,
• each binary relation ∼i is an equivalence relation on S ,
• each map Pi : S → ]0, 1] assigns a probability distribution over each ∼i -equivalence class, (i.e.
∑
{Pi (s
′) :
s ′ ∼i s} = 1), and
• the map [[·]] : AtProp → PS is a valuation.
As usual, the map [[·]] will be identified with its unique extension to L, so that we will be able to write [[φ]]
for every φ ∈ L.
Remark 2. The assumption that the probability of each state is strictly positive is needed for the update defined
in Theorem 2.7 to be well-defined. This is also the convention followed in [vES14] where subjective probabilities are
identified with “lotteries” assigned to each agent.
Remark 3. In the present treatment, the syntactic µi s (introduced in Theorem 2.1) are intended to correspond to
probability measures rather than probability distributions, as is more common in the literature. Indeed, usually, in
the literature formulas talking about probabilities are defined by the following syntax αPi (φ) ≥ β . But the Pi maps
are probability distributions defined over the models (i.e. in the semantics), hence the notation Pi (φ) is ambiguous
and neglects the fact that we need to use a probability measure to talk about the probability over the extension of φ.
Definition 2.3 (Substitution function). A substitution function
σ : AtProp → L
is a function that maps all but a finite 1 number of proposition letters to themselves.
We will call the set
{p ∈ AtProp | σ (p) , p}
the domain of σ and denote it dom(σ ).
Let SubL denote the set of all substitution functions and ϵ the identity substitution.
Definition 2.4 (Probabilistic event structure over a language). A probabilistic event structure over L is a tuple
E = (E, (∼i)i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub),
such that
• E is a non-empty finite set,
• each ∼i is an equivalence relation on E,
• each Pi : E → ]0, 1] assigns a probability distribution over each ∼i -equivalence class, i.e.∑
{Pi (e
′) | e ′ ∼i e} = 1,
• Φ is a finite set of pairwise inconsistent L-formulas, and
• pre assigns a probability distribution pre(•|ϕ) over E for every ϕ ∈ Φ.
• sub : E → SubL assigns a substitution function to each event in E.
1This assumption guarantees that events affect only a finite number of facts.
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Remark 4. The assumption that the probability of each event is strictly positive is needed for the update defined
in Theorem 2.7 to be well-defined. This is also the convention followed in [vES14, ABS16].
Informally, elements of E encode possible events, the relations ∼i encode as usual the epistemic uncertainty
of the agent i , who assigns probability Pi (e) to e being the actually occurring event, formulas in Φ are intended
as the preconditions of the event, and pre(e |ϕ) expresses the prior probability that the event e ∈ E might occur
in a(ny) state satisfying precondition ϕ. In addition, the substitution map sub(e) assigned to each event e ∈ E
describes how the event e changes the atomic facts of the world as represented by the proposition letters. In
what follows, we will refer to the structures E defined above as event structures over L.
Notation 1. For any probabilistic epistemic state modelM =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
, any probabilistic event
structure E, any s ∈ S and e ∈ E, we let pre(e | s) denote the value pre(e | ϕ), for the unique ϕ ∈ Φ such that
M, s  ϕ (recall that the formulas in Φ are pairwise inconsistent). If no such ϕ exists then we let pre(e | s) = 0.
2.2 Epistemic updates
In this subsection, we introduce an alternative and equivalent presentation of the update construction on PES-
models. This presentation is a variant of those introduced in [MPS14, KP13] for models of public announcement
logic and dynamic epistemic logic, and consists in a two-step process, namely, a co-product-type construction
followed by a suboject-type construction. This two-step presentation makes it possible to dualize the two steps
separately, and thus obtain the construction of (probabilistic) epistemic updates on algebras as the composition
of the two dualized constructions. The two steps are given in Definition 2.5 and Definition 2.7, and Lemma 2.8
proves that the updated model of a PES-model is a PES-model too.
Definition 2.5 (Intermediate structure). For any PES-modelM =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
and any probabilistic
event structure E = (E, (∼i)i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over L, let the intermediate structure of M and E be the
tuple ∐
EM :=
〈∐
|E | S, (∼
∐
i )i ∈Ag, (P
∐
i )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
∐〉
where
•
∐
|E | S  S × E is the |E |-fold coproduct of S ,
• each binary relation ∼
∐
i on
∐
|E | S is defined as follows:
(s, e) ∼
∐
i (s
′
, e ′) iff s ∼i s
′ and e ∼i e
′
,
• each map P
∐
i :
∐
|E | S → [0, 1] is defined by
(s, e) 7→ Pi (s) · Pi (e) · pre(e | s),
• and the valuation [[·]]∐ : AtProp → PS is defined by
[[p]]∐ := {(s, e) | s ∈ [[p]]M} = [[p]]M × E
for every p ∈ AtProp.
Remark 5. In general, P
∐
i does not induce probability distributions over the ∼
∐
i -equivalence classes. Hence,∐
EM is not a PES-model. However, the second step of the construction will yield a PES-model.
Finally, in order to define the updated model, observe that the map pre : E × Φ → [0, 1] in E induces the map
pre : E → L defined below.
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Definition 2.6. For any probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over L, let the map
pre be defined as follows:
pre : E → L
e 7→
∨
{ϕ ∈ Φ | pre(e | ϕ) , 0} .
Definition 2.7 (Updated model). For any PES-modelM =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
and any probabilistic event
structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over L, let the epistemic update ME of the model M by the
probabilistic event structure E be as follows:
M
E :=
〈
SE , (∼Ei )i ∈Ag, (P
E
i )i ∈Ag, [[·]]ME
〉
with
(1) SE :=
{
(s, e) ∈
∐
|E | S
 M, s  pre(e)};
(2) ∼Ei = ∼
∐
i ∩ (S
E × SE ) for any i ∈ Ag;
(3) each map P Ei : S
E → [0, 1] is defined by the assignment
(s, e) 7→
P
∐
i (s, e)∑ {
P
∐
i (s
′, e ′)
 (s, e) ∼i (s ′, e ′)} ;
(4) the map [[·]]ME : AtProp → P(S
E) is defined as follows:
[[p]]ME := [[sub(p)]]
∐ ∩ SE
where the map sub(p) : E → L is given by:
sub(p)(e) :=
{
sub(e)(p) if p ∈ dom(sub(e))
p otherwise.
Lemma 2.8. For any PES-modelM and any probabilistic event structure E over L, the epistemic update ME of
the modelM by the probabilistic event structure E is a PES-model.
Proof. To prove thatME is a PES-model (Theorem 2.2), we need to show that it satisfies the following prop-
erties:
(1) the set SE is finite,
(2) each relation ∼Ei is an equivalence relation on S ,
(3) each map P Ei : S
E → ]0, 1] assigns a probability distribution over each ∼Ei -equivalence class,
(4) the map [[·]] : AtProp → PSE is a valuation map.
Proof of item 1. The product of finite sets is finite.
Proof of items 2 and 4. Trivial.
Proof of item 3. The fact that P Ei (s, e) > 0 for every (s, e) ∈ S
E follows from Pi (s) > 0 for every s ∈ S and
Definition 2.5. Hence, by construction, P Ei is a probability distribution over ∼
E
i -equivalence classes. 
2.3 Semantics
In this subsection, we provide the semantics of PDEL over PES-models.
Definition 2.9 (Probability measure). Given a PES-model
M =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
,
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let the probability measure µMi : S × L → [0, 1] be defined as follows: for any ϕ ∈ L,
µMi (s,ϕ) :=
∑
s∼i s
′
s ′∈[[ϕ ]]
Pi (s
′).
Notice that µi defines a probability measure on each ∼i -equivalence class.
Definition 2.10 (Semantics of PDEL). Given a PES-model
M =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
,
and the probability measures µMi defined as in Definition 2.9, the formulas of the language L are interpreted as
follows:
M, s |= ⊥ iff never
M, s |= p iff s ∈ [[p]]
M, s |= ϕ ∧ψ iff M, s |= ϕ and M, s |= ψ
M, s |= ϕ ∨ψ iff M, s |= ϕ or M, s |= ψ
M, s |= ϕ → ψ iff M, s |= ϕ implies M, s |= ψ
M, s |= ♦iϕ iff there exists s
′ ∼i s such thatM, s
′ |= ϕ
M, s |= iϕ iff M, s
′ |= ϕ for all s ′ ∼i s
M, s |= 〈E, e〉ϕ iff M, s |= pre(e) and ME , (s, e) |= ϕ
M, s |= [E, e]ϕ iff M, s |= pre(e) implies ME , (s, e) |= ϕ
M, s |=
(
n∑
k=1
αkµi (φ)
)
≥ β iff
n∑
k=1
αk µ
M
i (s,φ) ≥ β
2.4 Axiomatization
PDEL is a logical framework bringing together epistemics, dynamics, and probabilities. Hence its axiomatization
describes the behaviour of each of these components as well as their interactions. The full axiomatization of
PDEL is given in Table 1 on page 9 and includes the axioms of classical multi-modal logic S5, understood as the
basic epistemic logic, axioms capturing the theory of linear inequalities with rational coefficients (cf. [FHM90,
Theorem 4.3]), axioms capturing basic classical probability theory (cf. [ABS16, vBGK09, FHM90, vES14, FH94]),
and axioms encoding the interaction between the dynamicmodalities and the other logical connectives [vBGK09,
ABS16], as well as the following inference rules: modus ponens, uniform substitution (see [WC13]), necessitation
for the static and dynamic modalities, and a substitution rule for the probabilistic operators µi (cf. [ABS16,
vBGK09, vES14, FH94]).
Lemma 2.11 (Soundness and Completeness). PDEL is sound and complete w.r.t. the axiomatization given in
Table 1.
Proof. The statement follows from the general proof in Appendix C and Stone type duality. 
3 METHODOLOGY
In the present section, we expand on the methodology of the paper. In the previous section, we gave a two-
step account of the product update construction which, for any PES-model M and any event model E over L,
yields the updated model ME as a certain submodel of a certain intermediate model
∐
EM. This account is
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Table 1. Axioms of PDEL
Axioms of classical modal logic S5
Tautologies of classical propositional logic
k. i (φ → ψ ) → (iφ → iψ )
dual. iφ ↔ ¬♦i¬φ
t. iφ → φ
iv. iφ → iiφ
v. ¬iφ → i¬iφ
Axioms capturing the theory of linear inequalities with rational coefficients
n0. t ≥ t
n1. (t ≥ β) ↔ (t + 0 · µi (φ) ≥ β)
n2.
(∑n
k=1 αk · µi (φk ) ≥ β
)
→
(∑n
k=1 ασ (k) · µi (φσ (k)) ≥ β
)
for any permutation σ over {1, ...,n}
n3.
( (∑n
k=1 αk · µi (φk ) ≥ β
)
∧
(∑n
k=1 α
′
k
· µi (φk ) ≥ β
′
))
→
(∑n
k=1(αk + α
′
k
) · µi (φk ) ≥ (β + β
′)
)
n4. ((t ≥ β) ∧ (d ≥ 0)) → (d · t ≥ d · β)
n5. (t ≥ β) ∨ (β ≥ t)
n6. ((t ≥ β) ∧ (β ≥ γ )) → (t ≥ γ )
Axioms capturing basic classical probability theory
p1. µi (⊥) = 0 p2. µi (⊤) = 1
p3. µi (φ ∧ψ ) + µi (φ ∧ ¬ψ ) = µi (φ)
p4. iφ ↔ (µi (φ) = 1)
p5.
(∑n
k=1 αk · µi (φk ) ≥ β
)
→ i
(∑n
k=1 αk · µi (φk ) ≥ β
)
Reduction Axioms
i1. [E, e]p ↔ (pre(e) → sub(e)(p))
i2. [E, e]¬φ ↔ (pre(e) → ¬[E, e]φ)
i4. [E, e](φ ∧ψ ) ↔ ([E, e]A∧ [E, e]B)
i5. [E, e]iA↔ (pre(e) →
∧
{i [E, f ]A | e ∼i f })
i6. [E, e]
(∑n
k=1 αk · µi (ψk ) ≥ β
)
↔ (pre(e) → C ≥ D) with
C =
∑
ϕ ∈Φ
∑
e∼i f
∑n
k=1 αk · pre(f | ϕ) · µi (ϕ ∧ [E, f ]ψk ) and
D =
∑
ϕ ∈Φ
∑
e∼i f β · pre(f | ϕ) · µi (ϕ)
Inference Rules
MP if ⊢ A→ B and ⊢ A, then ⊢ B
Neci if ⊢ A, then ⊢ iA
Necα if ⊢ A, then ⊢ [E, e]A
Subµ if ⊢ A→ B, then ⊢ µi (A) ≤ µi (B)
SubEq if ⊢ A↔ B, then ⊢ ϕ ↔ ϕ[A/B]
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analogous to those given in [MPS14, KP13] of the product updates of models of PAL and Baltag-Moss-Solecki’s
dynamic epistemic logic EAK. In each instance, the original product update construction can be illustrated by
the following diagram (which uses the notation introduced in the instance treated in the previous section):
M ֒→
∐
E
M ←֓ ME .
As is well known (see e.g. [DP02]) in duality theory, coproducts can be dually characterized as products, and
subobjects as quotients. In the light of this fact, the construction of product update, regarded as a “subobject
after coproduct” concatenation, can be dually characterized on the algebras dual to the relational structures of
PES-models by means of a “quotient after product” concatenation, as illustrated in the following diagram:
Aև
∏
E
A։ AE ,
resulting in the following two-step process. First, the coproduct
∐
E M is dually characterized as a certain product∏
E A, indexed as well by the states of E, and such that A is the algebraic dual of M; second, an appropriate
quotient of
∏
E A is then taken, which dually characterizes the submodel step. On which algebras are we going
to apply the “quotient after product” construction? The prime candidates are the algebras associated with the
PES-models via standard Stone-type duality:
Definition 3.1 (Complex algebra). For any PES-modelM =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
, its complex algebra is the
tuple
M
+ :=
(
PS, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag, (P
+
i )i ∈Ag
)
where for each i ∈ Ag and X ∈ PS ,
♦iX = {s ∈ S | ∃x (s ∼i x and x ∈ X )} ,
iX = {s ∈ S | ∀x (s ∼i x =⇒ x ∈ X )} ,
dom(P+i ) = {X ∈ PS | ∃y ∀x (x ∈ X =⇒ x ∼i y)} ,
P+i X =
∑
x ∈X
Pi (x).
Notice that the domain of P+i consists of all the subsets of the equivalence classes of ∼i .
In this setting, the “quotient after product” construction behaves exactly in the desired way, in the sense that
one can check a posteriori that the following holds:
Proposition 3.2. For every PES-modelM and any event structure E over L, the algebraic structures (M+)E and
(ME)+ can be identified.
Proof. This results follows from: (1) Fact 12 in [KP13] that states that for any (non probabilistic) Kripke
model N, the structures (N+)E and (NE)+ can be identified, and (2) Lemma 4.32 on page 22 that states that the
probability measures on the complex algebras (M+)E and (ME)+ are the same. 
Moreover, the “quotient after product” construction holds in much greater generality than the class of complex
algebras of PES-models, which is exactly its added value over the update on relational structures. In the following
section, we are going to define it in detail in the setting of epistemic Heyting algebras.
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4 PROBABILISTIC DYNAMIC EPISTEMIC UPDATES ON FINITE HEYTING ALGEBRAS
The present section aims at introducing the algebraic counterpart of the event update construction presented
in Section 2. For the sake of enforcing a neat separation between syntax and semantics, throughout the present
section, we will disregard the logical language L, and work on algebraic probabilistic epistemic structures (APE-
structures, see Definition 4.7) rather than on APE-models (i.e. APE-structures endowed with valuations). To be
able to define the update construction, we will need to base our treatment on a modified definition of event
structure over an algebra, rather than over L.
Structure of the section. In Section 4.1, we introduce epistemic Heyting algebras. In Section 4.2, we recall the
definition of intuitionistic probability from [Wea03] and endow epistemic Heyting algebras with measures to
define algebraic probabilistic epistemic structures. In Section 4.3, we define probabilistic event structures over
epistemic algebras, as the intuitionistic algebraic counterparts of classical probabilistic event structures. In Sec-
tion 4.4, we introduce the construction of intermediate pre-probabilistic event structure as the first step of the
algebraic event update construction. Finally, in Section 4.5, we introduce the pseudo-quotient update construc-
tion and define the event update on algebraic probabilistic epistemic structures.
4.1 Epistemic Heyting algebras
In this section we introduce epistemic Heyting algebras. We start by recalling the definition of monadic Heyting
algebras, which provide algebraic semantics for the logic MIPC, the intuitionistic analogue of the classical modal
logic S5 (cf. [Bez98, Bez99, KP13]). Then, we introduce the concept of i-minimal elements of monadic Heyting
algebras. Finally, we define epistemic Heyting algebras as those monadic Heyting algebras whose i-minimal
elements are enough to describe certain subalgebras of interest for the developments of the next sections.
Definition 4.1 (Monadic Heyting algebra (cf. [Bez98])). A monadic Heyting algebra is a tuple
A :=
(
L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag
)
such that L is a Heyting algebra, and each♦i and i is a monotone unary operation on L such that for all a,b ∈ L,
a ≤ ♦ia (M1)
ia ≤ a (M2)
♦i (a ∨ b) ≤ ♦ia ∨ ♦ib (M3)
i (a → b) ≤ ia → ib (M4)
♦ia ≤ i♦ia (M5)
♦iia ≤ ia (M6)
i (a → b) ≤ ♦ia → ♦ib (M7)
♦i⊥ ≤ ⊥ (M8)
⊤ ≤ i⊤ (M9)
Remark 6. The algebraic and duality theoretic treatment of monadic Heyting algebras has been developed in
[Bez98] and [Bez99]. In particular, as mentioned in [Bez98, Lemma 2], in the presence of (M9), axiom (M4) is
equivalent to ia ∧ib ≤ i (a ∧b), so all modalities are normal, and ♦i♦ia ≤ ♦ia and ia ≤ iia are derivable
from the axioms. These conditions correspond also in the best known intuitionistic settings to the transitivity of the
associated accessibility relations (cf. [CP12]). This implies in particular that ♦i is a closure operator for each i ∈ Ag.
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The next definition intends to capture algebraically the notion of equivalence cell in the epistemic space of
agents. Notice that for any equivalence relation R on a set X and any x ∈ X , the equivalence cell R[x] = R−1[x] =
〈R〉{x} is a minimal nonempty fixed point of 〈R〉.2 This justifies the following definition.
Definition 4.2 (i-minimal elements). Let A be a monadic Heyting algebra. An element a ∈ A is i-minimal if
(1) a , ⊥,
(2) ♦ia = a and
(3) if b ∈ A, b < a and ♦ib = b, then b = ⊥.
LetMini (A) denote the set of the i-minimal elements of A.
Remark 7. Notice that, for any b ∈ A \ {⊥}, there exists at most one a ∈ Mini (A) such that b ≤ a. Indeed every
such a must coincide with ♦ib.
Definition 4.3 (Epistemic Heyting algebra). An epistemic Heyting algebra is a finite monadic Heyting algebra
A :=
(
L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag
)
such that for every i ∈ Ag and every a ∈ A the following holds:
♦ia ∨ ¬♦ia = ⊤. (E)
Remark 8. The axiom above captures algebraically the requirement that i-minimal elements, representing cells
in the partition, cover the whole space.
In the remainder of the present section, A will denote an epistemic Heyting algebra.
Lemma 4.4. If A is an Epistemic Heyting algebra, then, for every agent i ,
♦iA := {♦ia ∈ A | a ∈ A}
is a Boolean sub-algebra of A. Furthermore, if
iA := {ia ∈ A | a ∈ A},
then ♦iA = iA.
Proof. That ♦iA is a subalgebra of A follows from the fact that the equalities
♦i (♦ia ∧ b) = ♦ia ∧ ♦ib and ♦i (♦ia → ♦ib) = ♦ia → ♦ib
hold in every monadic Heything algebra (see for example [Bez98, Lemma 2]). That ♦iA is a Boolean algebra
follows from the axiom (E) : ♦ia ∨ ¬♦ia = ⊤.
Finally, we can easily prove that ♦iA = iA using the axioms (M1), (M2), (M5) and (M6). 
Remark 9. Given the fact that Epistemic Heyting algebras are finite and since ♦iA is a Boolean algebra, it is not
hard to see that i-minimal elements are the atoms of ♦iA and hence
∨
Mini (A) = ⊤.
2Recall that, for any binary relation R ⊆ X × X , we define the maps R , R−1 and 〈R 〉 as follows:
R : X → PX R−1 : X → PX
x 7→ {x ′ ∈ X | (x, x ′) ∈ R } x 7→ {x ′ ∈ X | (x ′, x ) ∈ R }
〈R 〉 : PX → PX
S 7→ {x ′ ∈ X | ∃x ∈ S, (x ′, x ) ∈ R }.
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Notation 2. For any poset (partially ordered set) P = (P, ≤), we let
↓P : PP→ PP
X 7→ X↓P := {x
′ ∈ P | x ′ ≤ x for some x ∈ X }.
For the sake of readability, we drop the subscript and let X ↓ denote the downset generated by X . In addition, if
X = {x}, we let x ↓ denote the downset generated by {x}.
4.2 Algebraic probabilistic epistemic structures
In this Section, we introduce i-premeasures and i-measures and define algebraic pre-probabilistic and probabilis-
tic epistemic structures which will serve as the underlying structures of intuitionistic probabilistic epistemic
logic.
The following definition is an adaptation of a proposal of Weatherson’s (see [Wea03, page 2]) in which the
notion of probability is generalised and made parametric in a given consequence relation. Even though there is
no consensus onwhat an intuitionistic probability function should be,Weatherson’s proposal captures necessary
conditions for such a function and establishes a systematic link between logic and probability. The definition
below has also been adopted by [AGM08, FGM17].
Definition 4.5 (Intuitionistic probability measures). Let H be a Heyting algebra. A function Pr : H → [0, 1] is
an intuitionistic probability measure if the following conditions are satisfied: for all a,b ∈ H,
(1) Pr(⊥) = 0, (3) if a ≤H b, then Pr(a) ≤ Pr(b),
(2) Pr(⊤) = 1, (4) Pr(a) + Pr(b) = Pr(a ∨ b) + Pr(a ∧ b).
Notice that, for intuitionistic probability measures, it does no longer hold that Pr(p ∨ ¬p) = 1.
Given that, in classical PDEL, the probability functions range over equivalence classes instead of the whole
model, we need tomirror that fact by defining probability functions that are probability measures on the quotient
algebras generated by i-minimal elements.
Definition 4.6 (i-premeasure & i-measure). A partial function µ : A→ R+ is an i-premeasure onA, if it satisfies
the following properties:
(1) dom(µ) = Mini (A)↓;
(2) µ is order-preserving;
(3) for every a ∈ Mini (A) and all b, c ∈ a↓, we have µ(b ∨ c) = µ(b) + µ(c) − µ(b ∧ c);
(4) µ(⊥) = 0 if dom(µ) , ∅.
An i-premeasure on A is an i-measure, if it satisfies the following properties:
(5) µ(a) = 1 for every a ∈ Mini (A).
(6) for every a ∈ Mini (A) and all b, c ∈ a↓ such that b < c , it holds that µ(b) < µ(c);
Condition (1) ensures that the probability measures are defined on the quotient algebras generated by i-
minimal elements. Conditions (2) to (5) are imported fromWheatherson’s definition of intuitionistic probabilistic
functions. Condition (6) corresponds to the fact that in the classical case, the probability distributions over the
elements of the equivalence classes do not take value 0 (see Theorem 2.2, page 5)
Remark 10. In the case whenMini (A)↓ = ∅, there exists a unique i-(pre)measure, the empty function. Through-
out this section, all the results regarding i-minimal elements and i-(pre)measure hold vacuously in the case when
Mini (A)↓ = ∅.
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Definition 4.7 (ApPE-structure &APE-structure). An algebraic pre-probabilistic epistemic structure (ApPE-structure)
is a tuple
F :=
(
A, (µi )i ∈Ag
)
such that
(1) A is an epistemic Heyting algebra (see Definition 4.3), and
(2) each µi is an i-premeasure on A.
An ApPE-structure F is an algebraic probabilistic epistemic structure (APE-structure) if each µi is an i-measure
on A.
We refer to A as the support of F and we denote it support(F ).
4.2.1 The algebraic epistemic structure associated to a classical model.
Lemma 4.8. For any PES-modelM, the i-minimal elements of its complex algebraM+ are exactly the equivalence
classes of ∼i .
Proof. See Appendix A page 46. 
Proposition 4.9. For any PES-model M, its complex algebra M+ (see Definition 3.1) is an APE-structure (see
Definition 4.7).
Proof. See Appendix A page 46. 
4.3 Probabilistic event structures over epistemic Heyting algebras
In this section, we introduce intuitionistic event structures, which are needed to correctly generalise probabilis-
tic epistemic updates to an intuitionistic metatheory.
We will find it useful to introduce the following auxiliary definitions. Recall that amultiset is a generalisation
of the concept of set that allows multiple instances of the same element. Hence, {a,a,b} and {a,b} are the same
set, but different multisets. However, order does not matter, so {a,a,b} and {a,b,a} are the same multiset. Let
Φ be a multiset on the set X and a,b ∈ Φ. We say that a and b arise from the same element if a and b are copies
of the same element from X . We denote it a =X b.
Definition 4.10 (Ordered multiset on a lattice). Let L = (L, ≤) be a finite lattice. An ordered multiset Φ = (Φ, ≺)
on L is a multiset Φ of elements of L equipped with a strict order ≺ such that, for all pairwise distinct elements
x ,y, z ∈ Φ,
(1) if x ≺ y, then x ≤L y;
(2) if x , ⊥ and x ≤L y, then x ≺ y or y ≺ x ;
(3) if x ≺ y and x ≺ z, then y ≺ z or z ≺ y.
In the present paper, we use the membership symbol ∈ in the context of multisets on L always referring to
the copies of a given element of L. For instance, the variable y in the symbol y ∈ Φ refers to one specific copy of
some element of L.
Remark 11. In Section 5, we will be working with event structures over logical languages rather than with event
structures over algebras (see Definition 4.11). Event structures over languages (see Definition 5.2) are tuples where Φ
is a set of formulas each pair of which is made either of incompatible formulas or of formulas one of which implies
the other. However, some of these formulas might be identified with each other under some valuations. In order to
define updates on algebras independently from logic, in Definition 4.11 the ordered multisets above will play the
same role played by the sets Φ in event structures over languages. Specifically, the multiset structure serves to keep
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track of the fact that some elements of the lattice might be the interpretation of more than one formula in the set Φ,
and the order on the multiset Φ helps to keep track of the logical structure of the set Φ. Finally, condition 3 makes sure
that the order structure of Φ is an upward forest, and conditions 1 and 2 together guarantee that, with the exception
of formulas which are mapped to ⊥, the logical structure of the set Φ is preserved and reflected by the order ≺.
Now let us introduce probabilistic event structures in the intuitionistic setting:
Definition 4.11 (Probabilistic event structure over an epistemic Heyting algebra). For any epistemic Heyting
algebra A (see Definition 4.3), a probabilistic event structure over A is a tuple
E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre)
such that
(1) E is a non-empty finite set;
(2) each ∼i is an equivalence relation on E;
(3) each Pi : E → ]0, 1] assigns a probability distribution over each ∼i -equivalence class, i.e.∑
{Pi (e
′) | e ′ ∼i e} = 1;
(4) Φ = (Φ, ≺) is a finite ordered multiset on A such that, for all a,b ∈ Φ which arise from distinct elements
in A, either
a ∧A b = ⊥ or a <A b or b <A a;
(5) the map pre : E × Φ → [0, 1] assigns a probability distribution pre(•|a) over E for every a ∈ Φ;
(6) for all a ∈ Φ and e ∈ E, if pre(e |a) = 0 then pre(e |b) = 0 for all b ∈ Φ such that a ≺ b.
The definition above is a proper generalization of the analogous definition given in the classical setting
(Theorem 2.4). The main generalization concerns the fact that the elements in Φ (which are the potential in-
terpretants of formulas) are no longer required to be mutually inconsistent but may also be ‘logically depen-
dent’. In this latter case, the precondition function is required to satisfy an additional compatibility condition
which is similar to the one adopted in [AGM08]. For sake of readability, in what follows, we will simply refer to
probabilistic event structures over epistemic Heyting algebras as event structures.
Remark 12 (The substitution map). Clearly, a purely algebraic counterpart of the substitution map which was
part of the definition of probabilistic event structures over a language (see Definition 2.4) cannot be given.
Remark 13 (The order ≤A on the set Φ). The classical and the intuitionistic setting are distinguished by the
fact that states are pairwise incomparable in the classical setting and (non-trivially) ordered in the intuitionistic
setting. Thus, in probabilistic event structures over a language (see Definition 2.4) it is enough to require the set Φ to
contain mutually inconsistent formulas in order to tell apart states of the Kripke model. However, due to the order
between states of intuitionistic Kripke frames, mutually incompatible formulas are not enough to separate distinct
but comparable states. To overcome this hurdle we require Φ to satisfy the following condition: for all ak ,aj ∈ Φ,
aj ∧ ak = ⊥ or aj < ak or ak < aj .
This condition makes it possible to compute the probabilities of a given non-maximal state, even if there is no
proposition uniquely identifying this state (cf. Definition 4.15).
4.4 The intermediate (pre-)probabilistic epistemic structure
In the present subsection, we define the intermediate ApPE-structure
∏
E F associated with any APE-structure
F and any event structure E over the support of F (see Definition 4.7 for the definition of support):
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∏
E
F :=
(∏
E
A, (µ ′i )i ∈Ag
)
. (4.1)
Structure of the subsection. First, we define the intermediate algebra
∏
|E | A which will become the support of
the intermediate ApPE-structure
∏
E F (see Definition 4.12 and Proposition 4.13) and we identify its i-minimal
elements (see Proposition 4.14). Then,we introduce the i-premeasures on the intermediate algebra (seeDefinition
4.17 and Proposition 4.18). Finally, we show that the definition ApPE-structure is coherent with the relational
semantics in the classical case (see Proposition 4.21).
4.4.1 The intermediate algebra and its i-minimal elements.
Definition 4.12 (Intermediate algebra). For every epistemic Heyting algebra A = (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag) and
every event structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre) over A, let the intermediate algebra be∏
E
A := (
∏
|E |
L, {♦′i ,
′
i | i ∈ Ag}),
where
(1)
∏
|E | L is the |E |-fold power of L, the elements of which can be seen either as |E |-tuples of elements in A,
or as maps f : E → A;
(2) for any f : E → A, let us define ♦′i (f ) as follows:
♦′i (f ) : E → A
e 7→
∨
{♦i f (e
′) | e ′ ∼i e};
(3) for any f : E → A, let us define ′i (f ) as follows:

′
i (f ) : E → A
e 7→
∧
{i f (e
′) | e ′ ∼i e}.
Below, the algebra
∏
EA will be sometimes abbreviated as A
′.
We refer to [KP13, Section 3.1] for an extensive justification of the definition of the operations ♦′i and 
′
i .
Proposition 4.13. For every epistemic Heyting algebra A and every event structure E over A, the algebra A′ is
an epistemic Heyting algebra.
Proof. To prove thatA′ is an epistemic Heyting algebra (Theorem 4.3), we need to show thatA′ is a monadic
Heyting algebra such that for every i ∈ Ag and every f ∈ A′, we have: ♦i f ∨ ¬♦i f = ⊤.
The proof that A′ is a monadic Heyting algebra can be found in [KP13, Proposition 8.1]. Let i ∈ Ag, f ∈ A′,
and e ∈ E. We have:
(♦′i f ∨ ¬♦
′
i f )(e) = (♦
′
i f )(e) ∨ ¬(♦
′
i f )(e)
=
∨
{♦i (f (e
′)) | e ′ ∼ e} ∨ ¬
∨
{♦i (f (e
′)) | e ′ ∼ e} (by definition of ♦′i )
= ♦i
∨
{ f (e ′) | e ′ ∼ e} ∨ ¬♦i
∨
{ f (e ′) | e ′ ∼ e} (by the normality of ♦i )
= ⊤. (since ♦ia ∨ ¬♦ia = ⊤)
Hence, (♦′i f ∨ ¬♦
′
i f )(e) = ⊤ for all e ∈ E, which by definition yields that ♦
′
i f ∨ ¬♦
′
i f = ⊤.

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Proposition 4.14. For every epistemic Heyting algebra A and every agent i ∈ Ag,
Mini (A
′) = { fe,a | e ∈ E and a ∈ Mini (A)},
where for any e ∈ E and a ∈ Mini (A), the map fe,a is defined as follows:
fe,a : E → A
e ′ 7→
{
a if e ′ ∼i e
⊥ otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A page 47. 
4.4.2 The i-premeasures on the intermediate algebra. Before providing i-premeasures for the product epis-
temic algebra (Definition 4.17 and Proposition 4.18), we present an auxiliary definition.
Definition 4.15. Let F =
(
A, (µi )i ∈Ag
)
be an APE-structure and let E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre) be an event
structure over A. For all a ∈ Φ and i ∈ Ag, we define the partial function µai : A→ R
+ by
µai (x) := µi (x ∧ a) −
∑
b ∈mb(a)
µi (x ∧ b) (4.2)
where mb(a) denotes the multiset of the ≺-maximal elements of Φ ≺-below a.
We make the following observations regarding µai :
Proposition 4.16. For every APE-structure F =
(
A, (µi )i ∈Ag
)
and every event structure E over A, µai is an
i-premeasure over A. Furthermore, if a ≤ y then µai (x) = µ
a
i (x ∧y).
Proof. See Appendix A page 49. 
Remark 14. Notice that if a ≤ y, then for every b ∈ mb(a) we have b ≤ y, thus µi (x ∧ y ∧ a) = µi (x ∧ a) and
µi (x ∧ y ∧ b) = µi (x ∧ b), which implies that µ
a
i (x) = µ
a
i (x ∧ y).
Definition 4.17 (Intermediate structure). For any APE-structure F =
(
A, (µi )i ∈Ag
)
and any event structure
E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre) over A, let the intermediate structure be∏
E
F :=
(∏
E
A, (µ ′i )i ∈Ag
)
where
(1)
∏
EA = A
′ is defined as in Definition 4.12;
(2) each µ ′i is defined as follows:
µ ′i : Mini (A
′)↓ → R+ (4.3)
f 7→
∑
e ∈E
∑
a∈Φ
Pi (e) · µ
a
i (f (e)) · pre(e | a).
Proposition 4.18. For every APE-structure F and every event structure E over the support of F , the intermediate
structure
∏
E F is an ApPE-structure (see Definition 4.7). Furthermore, if
∨
a∈Φ a ≤ y then µ
′
i (x) = µ
′
i (x ∧ y).
Proof. Proposition 4.13 states that
∏
EA is an epistemic Heyting algebra. To prove that
∏
E F is an ApPE-
structure, it remains to show that for every i ∈ Ag, the map µ ′i is an i-premeasure (see items (1 - 4) of Definition
4.6). Fix i ∈ Ag. The map µ ′i is clearly well-defined. Since the maps {µ
a
i }a∈Φ are i-premeasures, the items 1, 2,
and 4 are trivially true.
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Proof of item 3. By Proposition 4.14, i-minimal elements ofA′ are of the form fe,b : E → A for some e ∈ E
and some i-minimal element b ∈ Mini (A). Fix one such element fe,b ∈ Mini (A′), and let д,h : E → A such that
д,h ≤ fe,b . By definition, f ≤ fe,b can be rewritten as f (e ′) ≤ fe,b(e ′) for any e ′ ∈ E. Since fe,b(e ′) = ⊥ for
any e ′ ≁i e , we can deduce that д(e ′) = h(e ′) = ⊥ for any e ′ ≁i e . Similarly, we can deduce that д(e ′) ≤ b and
h(e ′) ≤ b for any e ′ ∼i e . Hence,
µ ′i (д ∨ h) =
∑
e ′∈E
∑
a∈Φ
Pi (e
′) · µai (д(e
′) ∨ h(e ′)) · pre(e ′ | a) (by definition)
=
∑
e ′∈E
∑
a∈Φ
Pi (e
′) ·
(
µai (д(e
′)) + µai (h(e
′)) − µai (д(e
′) ∧ h(e ′))
)
· pre(e ′ | a)
(µai is an i-premeasure, b ∈ Mini (A), and д(e
′) ≤ b and h(e ′) ≤ b for any e ′ ∈ E)
= µ ′i (д) + µ
′
i (h) − µ
′
i (д ∧ h). (by definition)
Finally, the fact that if (
∨
a∈Φ a) ≤ y then µ
′
i (x) = µ
′
i (x ∧ y) follows from Proposition 4.16. 
4.4.3 The intermediate algebra for the classical case. Here, we show that the construction described above, ap-
plied to the complex algebras of classical models, dualizes the construction of the intermediate model of Section
2.2. This is the first step towards the result stated in Proposition 3.2.
Definition 4.19. For any PES-model M =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
(see Definition 2.2) and any probabilistic
event structure E = (E, (∼i)i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre) over L (see Definition 2.4), let the probabilistic event structure
over M+ (see Definitions 3.1 and 4.11) be
EE := (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,ΦM, preM),
where
• ΦM = (ΦM, ≺M) is the ordered multiset such that ΦM := {[[ϕ]]M | ϕ ∈ Φ} and the strict order ≺M is the
empty relation;
• the map pre
M
: ΦM → (E → [0, 1]) assigns a probability distribution preM(•|[[ϕ]]) : E → [0, 1] over E for
every ϕ ∈ Φ such that:
pre
M
(•|[[ϕ]]) : E → [0, 1] (4.4)
e 7→ pre(e | ϕ).
Proposition 4.20. For any PES-model M (see Definition 2.2) and any event structure E over L (see Definition
2.4), the tuple EE is an event structure over the epistemic Heyting algebra underlyingM
+.
Proof. We need to verify that the tuple EE satisfies Theorem 4.11. Items 1 to 3 are trivially satisfied. Hence,
we only need to prove that
4. ΦM = (ΦM, ≺M) is a finite ordered multiset on M+ such that, for all a,b ∈ ΦM which arise from distinct
elements inM+, either
a ∧M+ b = ⊥ or a <M+ b or b <M+ a;
5. the map pre
M
: E × ΦM → [0, 1] assigns a probability distribution preM(•|a) over E for every a ∈ ΦM;
6. for all a ∈ Φ and e ∈ E, if pre
M
(e |a) = 0 then pre
M
(e |b) = 0 for all b ∈ Φ such that a ≺ b.
Proof of 4. First, we need to prove that ΦM is an ordered multiset (Theorem 4.10). ΦM is clearly a multiset,
hence we only need to prove that the empty relation ≺M satisfies the following conditions: for all pairwise
distinct elements x ,y, z ∈ ΦM,
(i) if x ≺M y, then x ≤M+ y;
(ii) if x , ⊥M+ and x ≤M+ y, then x ≺M y or y ≺M x ;
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(iii) if x ≺M y and x ≺M z, then y ≺M z or z ≺M y.
Conditions (i) and (iii) are trivially satisfied. Notice that, since E is a (classical) probabilistic event structure, Φ
is a finite set of pairwise inconsistent L-formulas. Assume that [[ϕ]], [[ψ ]] ∈ ΦM are pairwise distinct (i.e. ϕ , ψ
in the language L) and such that [[ϕ]] ≤M+ [[ψ ]]. One can easily verify that ϕ ∧ψ = ⊥ implies that [[ϕ]] = ⊥M+ .
Hence, ≺M satisfies condition (ii). This finishes the proof that the ordered multiset ΦM is well-defined.
Let [[ϕ]], [[ψ ]] ∈ ΦM arise from distinct elements inM+. By definition, ϕ ∧ψ = ⊥. Hence, a ∧M+ b = ⊥, which
proves item 4.
Proof of 5. Since E is a (classical) probabilistic event structure, pre assigns a probability distribution pre(•|ϕ)
over E for every ϕ ∈ Φ. Hence, the map pre
M
is well-defined.
Proof of 6. Since ≺M is the empty relation, this condition is trivially true. 
Remark 15. Notice that, in the classical case, mb(a) = ∅ for all a ∈ Φ. Indeed,mb(a) denotes the multiset of the
≺-maximal elements of Φ ≺-below a. But, since in the classical case ≺M is the empty relation, there is no element
below a in Φ.
Proposition 4.21. For every PES-modelM and any event structure E over L,
(
∐
E
M)+ 
∏
EE
M
+
.
Proof. See Appendix A page 51. 
Corollary 4.22. For every PES-model M and any event structure E over L, the complex algebra (
∐
E M)
+ of
the intermediate structure
∐
EM is an ApPE-structure.
4.5 The pseudo-quotient and the updated APE-structure
In the present subsection, we define the APE-structure F E, resulting from the update of the APE-structure F
with the event structure E over the support of F , by taking a suitable pseudo-quotient of the intermediate APE-
structure
∏
E F . Some of the results which are relevant for the ensuing treatment (such as the characterization
of the i-minimal elements in the pseudo-quotient) are independent of the fact that we will be working with the
intermediate algebra. Therefore, in what follows, we will discuss them in the more general setting of arbitrary
epistemic Heyting algebras A.
Structure of the subsection. First, we define the pseudo-quotient algebra (Definition 4.23) and prove that it is
an epistemic Heyting algebra (Proposition 4.24). Then, we characterize the i-minimal elements of the pseudo-
quotient algebra (Proposition 4.27). Finally, we define the APE-structure F E, resulting from the update of the
APE-structure F with the event structure E (Definition 4.28 and Proposition 4.30) and show that this definition
is compatible with the update on PES-models (Lemma 4.32).
Pseudo-quotient algebra.
Definition 4.23 (Pseudo-quotient algebra). (cf. [MPS14, Sections 3.2, 3.3]) For any epistemic Heyting algebra
A := (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag), and any a ∈ A, let the pseudo-quotient algebra be
A
a := (L/a , (♦
a
i )i ∈Ag, (
a
i )i ∈Ag),
where
• a is defined as follows: for all b, c ∈ L,
b a c iff b ∧ a = c ∧ a,
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• for every i ∈ Ag the operations ♦ai and 
a
i are defined as follows:
♦ai : A
a → Aa and ai : A
a → Aa
b 7→ [♦i (b ∧ a)] b 7→ [i (a → b)],
where [c] denotes the a-equivalence class of c ∈ A.
Proposition 4.24. (cf. [MPS14, Fact 12]) For any epistemic Heyting algebra A, the pseudo-quotient algebra Aa
(see Definition 4.23) is an epistemic Heyting algebra.
Proof. The proof that Aa is a monadic Heyting algebra can be found in [MPS14, Fact 12]. To show that Aa
is an epistemic Heyting algebra (see Theorem 4.3), it remains to prove that ♦ai [b] ∨ ¬♦
a
i [b] = [⊤] for all i ∈ Ag
and b ∈ Aa . We have that ♦ai [b] = [♦i (b ∧ a)] and that ¬♦
a
i [b] = ¬[♦i (b ∧ a)] = [¬♦i (b ∧ a)]. Hence,
♦ai [b] ∨ ¬♦
a
i [b] = [♦i (b ∧ a) ∨ ¬♦i (b ∧ a)] = [⊤],
since A is an epistemic Heyting algebra. 
The i-minimal elements of the pseudo-quotient algebra.
Lemma 4.25. For any epistemic Heyting algebra A and any a ∈ A, if b ∈ Mini (A) and b ∧ a , ⊥, then
[b] ∈ Mini (A
a).
Proof. Fix some b ∈ Mini (A) such that b ∧ a , ⊥. We need to prove that [b] ∈ Aa satisfies items 1, 2, and 3
of Definition 4.2.
Proof of item 1. By assumption, [b] , ⊥, hence [b] satisfies item 1.
Proof of item 2. To show that ♦ai [b] = [b], it is enough to show that ♦i (b∧a)∧a = b∧a. Clearly, b∧a ≤ b
implies that ♦i (b ∧ a) ∧ a ≤ ♦ib ∧ a = b ∧ a, making use that ♦ib = b. Conversely, recalling that ♦i is reflexive
(Definition 4.1, axiom (M1)), we have b ∧ a = (b ∧ a) ∧ a ≤ ♦i (b ∧ a) ∧ a. Hence, ♦ai [b] = [b].
Proof of item 3. We need to prove that [b] is a minimal fixed point of ♦ai . Let [⊥] , [c] ≤ [b] such
that ♦ai [c] = [c], and let us show that [c] = [b]. It is enough to show that c ∧ a = b ∧ a. The assumption that
[c] ≤ [b] implies that c ∧ a ≤ b ∧ a ≤ b. Hence, ♦i (c ∧ a) ≤ ♦ib = b. Notice that the assumption that ♦i is
transitive (Definition 4.1, axiom (M6)) implies that ♦i♦i (c ∧a) = ♦i (c ∧a), that is ♦i (c ∧a) is a fixed point of ♦i .
Moreover, ⊥ , c ∧ a ≤ ♦i (c ∧ a) implies that ♦i (c ∧ a) , ⊥. Hence, by the i-minimality of b in A, we conclude
that ♦i (c ∧ a) = b, and hence ♦i (c ∧ a) ∧ a = b ∧ a. Moreover, the assumption that ♦ai [c] = [c] implies that
♦i (c ∧ a) ∧ a = c ∧ a. Thus, the following chain of identities holds c ∧ a = ♦i (c ∧ a) ∧ a = b ∧ a as required. 
Lemma 4.26. For any epistemic Heyting algebraA and any a ∈ A, if [b] ∈ Mini (A
a), then ♦i (b∧a) is the unique
i-minimal element of A which belongs to [b].
Proof. See Appendix A page 53. 
Combining the two lemmas above, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4.27. The following are equivalent for any A and any a ∈ A:
(1) [b] ∈ Mini (A
a);
(2) [b] = [b ′] for a unique b ′ ∈ Mini (A) such that b
′ ∧ a , ⊥.
Notation 3. In what follows, whenever [b] ∈ Mini (A
a), we will assume w.l.o.g. that b ∈ Mini (A) is the “canon-
ical” (in the sense of Proposition 4.27) representant of [b].
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The updated APE-structure. For any APE-structure F and any event structure E over the support A of F , the
map pre in E induces the map pre defined as follows:
pre : E → A
e 7→
∨
a∈Φ
pre(e |a),0
a (4.5)
It immediately follows from Propositions 4.14 and 4.27 that the i-minimal elements of AE are exactly the
elements [fe,b] for e ∈ E and b ∈ Mini (A) such that b ∧ pre(e
′) , ⊥ for some e ′ ∼i e .
Definition 4.28 (Updated APE-structure). For any APE-structure F and any event structure E over the support
of F , the updated APE-structure is the tuple
F E := (AE, (µEi )i ∈Ag)
such that:
(1) AE is obtained by instantiating Definition 4.23 to
∏
EA and pre ∈
∏
EA, i.e.
A
E := (
∏
E
A)pre ;
(2) The maps µEi are defined as follows:
µEi : Mini (A
E)↓ → [0, 1]
[д] 7→
{
0 if [д] = ⊥,
µ ′i (д)
µ ′i (f )
otherwise,
where [f] is the only element in Mini (AE) such that [д] ≤ [f ].3
Lemma 4.29. For any APE-structure F and any event structure E over the support of F , the maps (µEi )i ∈Ag of the
updated APE-structure F E := (AE, (µEi )i ∈Ag) are well-defined.
Proof. Let us first prove the following claim.
Claim 1. For each [h] ∈ Mini (A
E)↓ such that [h] , ⊥, we have µ ′i ([h]) , 0.
Proof of claim. Let e ∈ E be such that (h ∧ pre)(e) , ⊥. Notice that
(h ∧ pre)(e) , ⊥ iff h(e) ∧
∨
a∈Φ
pre(e |a),0
a , ⊥.
This implies that there is a ∈ Φ such that
pre(e | a) > 0 and h(e) ∧ a , ⊥.
Since µi is an i-measure (see Theorem 4.6), we have µi ((h ∧ a)(e)) > 0. Then, the following set is non-empty
{a ∈ Φ | µi ((h ∧ a)(e)) > 0 and pre(e |a) > 0}.
Since Φ is finite, it is well-founded with respect to the order of the multiset ≺, hence it contains at least one
minimal element. Let a0 be such a minimal element. From item (6) of Definition 4.11, we deduce that, for every
3See Definition 4.17 for the definition of the maps (µ′i )i∈Ag.
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b ∈ Φ such that b ≺ a0, it is the case that pre(e |b) > 0. The minimality of a0 implies that, for every b ∈ Φ such
that b ≺ a0, we have µi ((h ∧ b)(e)) = 0. This implies that, for all b ∈ mb(a), we have µi ((h ∧ b)(e)) = 0. Hence,
µ
a0
i (h(e)) = µi (д(e) ∧ a0) −
∑
b ∈mb(a0)
µi (h(e) ∧ b) (see Theorem 4.15)
= µi (h(e) ∧ a0).
Therefore µa0i (h(e)) > 0 and Pi (e) · µ
a0
i (h(e)) · pre(e |a0) > 0. This guarantees that µ
′
i ([h]) , 0. This finishes the
proof of the claim. 
Now, let us prove that the map µEi is well-defined. Recall that, if [д] , ⊥, then [f ] is unique (see Remark 7).
From the claim above, it follows that the division
µ ′i (д)
µ ′i (f )
is defined. Finally, let us verify that µEi assigns exactly one
value to every [д] ∈ Mini (AE)↓. Let д1,д2 ∈ [д]. Then we have µ ′i (д1) = µ
′
i (д1 ∧ pre) = µ
′
i (д2 ∧ pre) = µ
′
i (д2) (see
Proposition 4.18). Since µ ′i is order-preserving, strictly positive for [f ] , ⊥ and µ
E
i ([д]) =
µ ′i (д)
µ ′i (f )
with 0 < [д] ≤ [f ],
we have that the division
µ ′i (д)
µ ′i (f )
is defined and
µ ′i (д)
µ ′i (f )
≤ 1. Hence, µEi is well-defined for any i ∈ Ag. 
Proposition 4.30. For any APE-structure F and any event structure E over the support of F , the tuple F E =
(AE, (µEi )i ∈Ag) is an APE-structure.
Proof. See Appendix A page 53. 
The updated algebra for the classical case. In this section, we conclude the proof of Proposition 3.2 by show-
ing that the pseudo-quotient construction described above, applied to the complex algebras of the intermediate
classical models, dualizes the submodel construction in Section 2.2.
The definition of the complex algebra of a PES-model (Definition 3.1) can be equivalently reformulated as
follows.
Definition 4.31 (Complex algebra). For any PES-model M =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
, its complex algebra is
the tuple
M
+ :=
(
PS, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag, (P
+
i )i ∈Ag
)
where
(1) for each i ∈ Ag and X ∈ PS ,
♦iX = {s ∈ S | ∃x (s ∼i x and x ∈ X )},
iX = {s ∈ S | ∀x (s ∼i x =⇒ x ∈ X )},
(2) A := 〈PS, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag〉 is an epistemic Heyting algebra,
(3) for each i ∈ Ag and X ∈ PS ,
P+i : Mini (A)↓ → A
X 7→
∑
x ∈X
Pi (x).
Notice that the domain of P+i consists of all the subsets of the equivalence classes of ∼i .
Lemma 4.32. For any PES-modelM and any event structure E over L,
(P+i )
EE  (P Ei )
+
.
Proof. See Appendix A page 55. 
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5 INTUITIONISTIC PDEL
In this section, we introduce the Intuitionistic Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic (IPDEL). We define its
syntax in Section 5.1, and its algebraic semantics (Theorem 5.6) in Section 5.2. Then, in Section 5.3, we introduce
the axiomatisation of IPDEL (Table 2) and state its soundness and completeness. For the proofs, see Appendices
B and C.
5.1 The language of IPDEL
Definition 5.1 (IPDEL language). The set L of IPDEL-formulas φ and the class of intuitionistic probabilistic event
structures E over L are built by simultaneous recursion as follows:
φ ::= p | ⊥ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | φ → φ | ♦iφ | iφ | 〈E, e〉φ | [E, e]φ | (
n∑
k=1
αk µi (φ)) ≥ β,
where i ∈ Ag, and, following [FH94], we let αk , β be rational numbers, and the event structures E are as in
Definition 5.2.
The connectives ⊤, ¬, and↔ are defined by the usual abbreviations.
Definition 5.2 (Intuitionistic probabilistic event structure). An intuitionistic probabilistic event structure over L
is a tuple
E = (E, (∼i)i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub),
such that
• E is a non-empty finite set;
• each ∼i is an equivalence relation on E;
• each Pi : E → ]0, 1] assigns a probability distribution over each ∼i -equivalence class, i.e.∑
{Pi (e
′) | e ′ ∼i e} = 1;
• Φ is a finite set of formulas in L such that, for all ϕk ,ϕ j ∈ Φ, one and only one of the following conditions
is true:
– ⊢ (ϕ j ∧ ϕk ) → ⊥,
– ⊢ ϕk → ϕ j ,
– ⊢ ϕ j → ϕk ;
• the map pre : E × Φ → [0, 1] assigns a probability distribution pre(•|ϕ) over E for every ϕ ∈ Φ;
• the map sub : E → SubL assigns a substitution function (see Theorem 2.3) to each event in E;
• for all ϕ j ∈ Φ and e ∈ E, if pre(e |ϕ j ) = 0 then pre(e |ϕk ) = 0 for all ϕk ∈ Φ such that ⊢ ϕ j → ϕk .
Remark 16. The conditions on Φmatch the conditions ofΦ given in Theorem 4.11 (cf. Definition 5.4). The require-
ment in Theorem 4.11 that Φ is a multiset stems from the fact that the interpretation of distinct formulas ϕk ,ϕ j such
that ϕk → ϕ j might coincide in a model.
Remark 17. The conditions on the preconditions are given using ⊢. One should refer to Section 5.3 and Table 2 for
the axiomatisation of IPDEL.
5.2 Algebraic semantics
In what follows, we define the models, the event structures on the language, the event structures on the model,
the updated models and the semantics. Notice that the definition of the event structure on the model relies on
the definition of the event structure on the language, and that the definitions of the event structure on the model,
the updated models and the semantics are given by simultaneous induction.
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Definition 5.3 (APE-models). Algebraic probabilistic epistemic models (APE-models) are tuplesM = 〈F ,v〉 such
that F =
(
A, (µi )i ∈Ag
)
is an APE-structure and v : AtProp → A.
The update construction of Section 4 extends from APE-structures to APE-models. Indeed, for any APE-model
M = 〈A, (µi )i ∈Ag,v〉 and any event structure E (see Definition 5.2), the event structure E induces an event
structure over the algebra A (see Definition 4.11) as follows.
Definition 5.4. For any APE-modelM = 〈A, (µi )i ∈Ag,v〉 and any event structure
E = (E, (∼i)i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub),
over L, the following tuple is an event structure over A
EE := (E, (∼i)i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,ΦM, preM),
where
• Φ := (ΦM , ≺M) with ΦM := {[[ϕ]]M | ϕ ∈ Φ} and ≺M := {([[ϕ j ]], [[ϕk]]) | ⊢ ϕ j → ϕk }, and
• preM assigns a probability distribution preM(•|a) over E for every a ∈ ΦM .
It is straightfoward to verify that EE defined above is an event structure.
Definition 5.5 (Updated model). The update of the APE-modelM = 〈F ,v〉 by the intuitionistic probabilistic
event structure E = (E, (∼i)i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) is given by the APE-model
ME := 〈F E ,vE〉,
where
• F E := F EE as in Definition 4.28,
• and the map vE is defined as follows:
vE : AtProp → AEE
p 7→
{
[v
∏
(sub(e)(p))] if p ∈ dom(sub(e))
[v
∏
(p)] otherwise
where
v
∏
(p) : E →
∏
EE
A and v
∏
(sub(e)(p)) : E →
∏
EE
A
e 7→ v(p) e 7→ v(sub(e)(p)).
Notation 4. We define the e-th projection πe for every e ∈ E, the quotient map π and the map ι as follows:
πe :
∏
EE
A→ A and π :
∏
EE
A→ AEE and ι : AEE →
∏
EE
A
д 7→ д(e) д 7→ [д] [д] 7→ д ∧ pre.
As explained in [MPS14, Section 3.2], the map ι is well-defined.
Definition 5.6 (Semantics). The interpretation of L-formulas on any APE-modelM is defined recursively as
follows:
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[[⊥]]M = ⊥
A [[⊤]]M = ⊤
A
[[p]]M = v(p) [[φ → ψ ]]M = [[φ]]M →
A [[ψ ]]M
[[φ ∧ψ ]]M = [[φ]]M ∧
A [[ψ ]]M [[φ ∨ψ ]]M = [[φ]]M ∨
A [[ψ ]]M
[[♦iφ]]M = ♦i [[φ]]M [[iφ]]M = i [[φ]]M
[[〈E, e〉φ]]M = [[pre(e)]]M ∧
A πe ◦ ι([[φ]]MEE ) [[[E, e]φ]]M = [[pre(e)]]M →
A πe ◦ ι([[φ]]MEE )[[ (
n∑
k=1
αk µi (φk )
)
≥ β
]]
M
=
∨{
a ∈ A
 a ∈ Mini (A) and
(
n∑
k=1
αk µi ([[φk ]]M ∧ a)
)
≥ β
}
5.3 Axiomatisation
IPDEL is intended as the intuitionistic counterpart of classical PDEL. The full axiomatisation of IPDEL is given
in Table 2 (see page 26). This axiomatisation differs from the one of classical PDEL (cf. Table 1) in that the axioms
for S5 are replaced by the axioms of intuitionistic modal logic MIPC and axiom E (see Definition 4.3), and the
axioms capturing classical probability theory are replaced by axioms capturing intuitionistic probability theory.
In particular, axioms p3 and p4 in Table 1 are different from the axioms P3 and P4 in Table 2. It is not hard to
see that axiom p3 implies P3 and µi (φ) + µi (¬φ) = 1 in the presence of p1 and p2. Axiom P3 is strictly weaker
that p3, since the aforementioned equality is generally false for intuitionistic probabilities. Axioms p4 and P4
are classically equivalent. In intuitionistic logic, P4 is strictly stronger than p4. Indeed, as Lemma 5.8 shows, p4
is not strong enough to express the strict monotonicity of i-measures. Finally, notice that axioms M8 and M9
from Theorem 4.1 are not in Table 2. Indeed, they follow from the remaining axioms and the necessitation rules
(see Lemma 5.7 and also compare with [Bez98]).
Lemma 5.7. Axioms M8 and M9 from Theorem 4.1 are derivable from rules and axioms in Table 2.
Proof. Axiom M9 (i.e. ⊤ ≤ i⊤) is a direct consequence of the necessitation rule. Axiom M8 (i.e. ♦i⊥ ≤ ⊥)
can be derived as follows: by instantiating axiom M6 with ⊥, one gets ♦ii⊥ → i⊥; by instantiating axiom
M2 with ⊥, one gets i⊥ → ⊥; since, in addition, ⊥ → i⊥ (axiom H9), one gets that i⊥ ↔ ⊥; by substitution
of logical equivalence (rule SubEq) in ♦ii⊥ → i⊥, one gets ♦i⊥ → ⊥ as required. 
Lemma 5.8. Axiom P4 in Table 2 implies axiom p4 in Table 1. In classical logic the two formulas are equivalent
in the context of the rest of the axioms. Finally, there exists an ApPE-structure that validates axiom p4 but doesn’t
validate axiom P4.
Proof. Recall that
(P4) ((i (ϕ → ψ )) ∧ (µi (ϕ) = µi (ψ ))]) ↔ i (ψ ↔ ϕ),
(p4) iφ ↔ (µi (φ) = 1).
That P4 implies p4 follows immediately by replacingψ with ⊤. Now, let us prove that p4 implies P4 in classical
logic. We first show that p4 implies i (ψ ↔ ϕ) → ((i (ϕ → ψ )) ∧ (µi (ϕ) = µi (ψ ))]) as follows.
i (ψ ↔ ϕ) ⇔ µi (ψ ↔ ϕ) = 1 (Axiom p4)
⇔ µi ((¬ψ ∨ ϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ψ )) = 1 (classical logic equivalence)
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Table 2. Axioms of IPDEL
Axioms of IPL
H1. A→ (B → A) H2. (A→ (B → C)) → ((A→ B) → (A→ C))
H3. A→ (B → A ∧ B) H4. (A→ C) → ((B → C) → (A ∨ B → C))
H5. A ∧ B → A H6. A ∧ B → B
H7. A→ A ∨ B H8. B → A ∨ B
H9. ⊥ → A
Axioms for static modalities
M1. p → ♦ip M2. ip → p
M3. ♦i (p ∨ q) → ♦ip ∨ ♦iq M4. i (p → q) → (ip → iq)
M5. ♦ip → i♦ip M6. ♦iip → ip
M7. i (p → q) → (♦ip → ♦iq) E. ♦ip ∨ ¬♦ip
Axioms for inequalities
N0. t ≥ t N1. (t ≥ β) ↔ (t + 0 · µi (φ) ≥ β)
N2.
(∑n
k=1 αk · µi (φk ) ≥ β
)
→
(∑n
k=1 ασ (k) · µi (φσ (k)) ≥ β
)
for any permutation σ over {1, ...,n}
N3.
(∑n
k=1 αk · µi (φk ) ≥ β
)
∧
(∑n
k=1 α
′
k
· µi (φk ) ≥ β
′
)
→
(∑n
k=1(αk + α
′
k
) · µi (φk ) ≥ (β + β
′)
)
N4. ((t ≥ β) ∧ (d ≥ 0)) → (d · t ≥ d · β) N5. (t ≥ β) ∨ (β ≥ t)
N6. (t ≥ β) → (t > γ ) for all γ < β
Axioms for Intuitionistic Probabilities
P1. µi (⊥) = 0 P2. µi (⊤) = 1
P3. µi (φ) + µi (ψ ) = µi (φ ∨ψ ) + µi (φ ∧ψ ) P4. ((i (φ → ψ )) ∧ (µi (φ) = µi (ψ ))) ↔ i (ψ ↔ φ)
P5.
(∑n
k=1 αk · µi (φk ) ≥ β
)
→ i
(∑n
k=1 αk · µi (φk ) ≥ β
)
Reduction Axioms
I1. [E, e]p ↔ pre(e) → sub(e,p) I2. 〈E, e〉p ↔ pre(e) ∧ sub(e,p)
I3. [E, e] ⊤ ↔ ⊤ I4. 〈E, e〉⊤ ↔ pre(e)
I5. [E, e] ⊥ ↔ ¬pre(e) I6. 〈E, e〉⊥ ↔ ⊥
I7. [E, e] (ψ1 ∧ψ2) ↔ [E, e]ψ1 ∧ [E, e]ψ2 I8. 〈E, e〉(ψ1 ∧ψ2) ↔ 〈E, e〉ψ1 ∧ 〈E, e〉ψ2
I9. [E, e] (ψ1 ∨ψ2) ↔ pre(e) → 〈E, e〉ψ1 ∨ 〈E, e〉ψ2 I10. 〈E, e〉(ψ1 ∨ψ2) ↔ 〈E, e〉ψ1 ∨ 〈E, e〉ψ2
I11. [E, e] (ψ1 → ψ2) ↔ 〈E, e〉ψ1 → 〈E, e〉ψ2 I12. 〈E, e〉(ψ1 → ψ2) ↔ pre(e) ∧ (〈E, e〉ψ1 → 〈E, e〉ψ2)
I13. [E, e]♦iψ ↔ pre(e) →
∨
e ′∼ie ♦i (〈E, e
′〉ψ ) I14. 〈E, e〉♦iψ ↔ pre(e) ∧
∨
e ′∼ie ♦i (〈E, e
′〉ψ )
I15. [E, e]iψ ↔ pre(e) →
∧
e ′∼ie i ([E, e
′]ψ ) I16. 〈E, e〉iψ ↔ pre(e) ∧
∧
e ′∼ie i ([E, e
′]ψ )
I17. [E, e] (αµi (ψ ) ≥ β) ↔ pre(e) → (C + D ≥ 0) I18. 〈E, e〉(αµi (ψ ) ≥ β) ↔ pre(e) ∧ (C ′ + D ≥ 0)
where
C :=
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i ([E, e
′]ψ ) C ′ :=
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (〈E, e
′〉ψ )
D :=
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (⊤),
with
µ
ϕ
i (ψ ) := µi (ψ ∧ ϕ) −
∑
σ ∈mb(ϕ ) µi (ψ ∧ σ ) and mb(ϕ) := max→ Φ∩↓ϕ.
Inference Rules
MP. if ⊢ A→ B and ⊢ A, then ⊢ B
Neci if ⊢ A, then ⊢ iA Necα if ⊢ A, then ⊢ [E, e]A
Subµ if ⊢ A→ B, then ⊢ µi (A) ≤ µi (B) SubEq if ⊢ A↔ B, then ⊢ ϕ ↔ ϕ[A/B]
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Notice that
(¬ψ ∨ ϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) → (¬ψ ∨ ϕ) (5.1)
(¬ψ ∨ ϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) → (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) (5.2)
Hence, using the rule Subµ : if ⊢ A→ B, then ⊢ µi (A) ≤ µi (B), the equality µi ((¬ψ ∨ ϕ) ∧ (¬ϕ ∨ψ )) = 1 and the
equations (5.1) and (5.2), one can prove that
(µi (¬ψ ∨ ϕ) = 1) ∧ (µi (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) = 1)
Using p4, we can derive that i (ϕ → ϕ). It remains to derive that µi (ψ ) = µi (ϕ) as follows.
(µi (¬ψ ∨ ϕ) = 1) ∧ (µi (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) = 1)
⇒ (µi (¬(¬ψ ∨ ϕ)) = 0) ∧ (µi (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) = 1) (µi (φ) = 1 − µi (¬φ) in PDEL, see Table 1)
⇒ (µi (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) = 0) ∧ (µi (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) = 1) (De Morgan laws)
⇒ (µi (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) = 0) ∧ (µi (¬ϕ) + µi (ψ ) − µi (ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) = 1)
(µi (φ) + µi (ψ ) = µi (φ ∨ψ ) + µi (φ ∧ψ ) in PDEL, see Table 1)
⇒ µi (¬ϕ) + µi (ψ ) = 1
⇒ µi (¬ϕ) + µi (ψ ) = µi (ϕ) + µi (¬ϕ) (µi (ϕ) + µi (¬ϕ) = 1 in PDEL, by axioms p2 and p3)
⇒ µi (ψ ) = µi (ϕ).
Now, we show that p4 implies ((i (ϕ → ψ )) ∧ (µi (ϕ) = µi (ψ ))]) → i (ψ ↔ ϕ) as follows.
i (ϕ → ψ ) ∧ (µi (ϕ) = µi (ψ ))
⇒ (µi (¬ϕ ∨ψ ) = 1) ∧ (µi (ϕ) = µi (ψ )) (Axiom p4)
⇒ (µi (¬ϕ) + µi (ψ ) − µi (¬ϕ ∧ψ ) = 1) ∧ (µi (ϕ) = µi (ψ )) (µi (φ) + µi (ψ ) = µi (φ ∨ψ ) + µi (φ ∧ψ ) in PDEL)
⇒ (µi (¬ϕ) + µi (ψ ) − µi (¬ϕ ∧ψ ) = 1) ∧ (µi (¬ϕ) = µi (¬ψ )) (µi (ϕ) + µi (¬ϕ) = 1 in PDEL)
⇒ (µi (¬ψ ) + µi (ψ ) − µi (¬ϕ ∧ψ ) = 1)
⇒ (1 − µi (¬ϕ ∧ψ ) = 1) (µi (ϕ) + µi (¬ϕ) = 1 in PDEL)
⇒ (µi (¬ϕ ∧ψ ) = 0) (µi (ϕ) + µi (¬ϕ) = 1 in PDEL)
⇒ (µi (ϕ ∨ ¬ψ ) = 1) (µi (ϕ) + µi (¬ϕ) = 1 in PDEL)
⇒ (µi (ψ → ϕ) = 1)
⇒ i (ψ → ϕ) (Axiom p4)
This concludes the proof that in classical logic p4 and P4 are equivalent. Finally, consider the Heyting algebra
H in Figure 1 with
♦x :=
{
⊤ if x , ⊥,
⊥ if x = ⊥
x :=
{
⊥ if x , ⊤,
⊤ if x = ⊤
and µ(⊥) = 0, µ(a) = 0.5, µ(b) = 0.5 and µ(⊤) = 1.
It is easy to see that the Heyting algebra in Figure 1 satisfies all axioms of IPDEL except for P4 and it satisfies
p4. It falsifies P4 because ((a → b)) ∧ (µ(a) = µ(b)) = ⊤, while (a ↔ b) = ⊥. 
Theorem 5.9 (Soundness). The axiomatization for IPDEL given in Table 2 is sound w.r.t. APE-models.
Theorem 5.10 (Completeness). The axiomatisation for IPDEL given in Table 2 is weakly complete w.r.t. APE-
models.
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⊤
b
a
⊥
Fig. 1. Heyting algebra H
The proof of soundness is given in Appendix B and the proof of completeness is given in Appendix C.
6 RELATIONAL SEMANTICS
In this section, we introduce the finite relational semantics of IPDEL, as the dual structures of epistemic Heyting
algebras within the duality between monadic Heyting algebras andMIPC-frames (cf. [Bez99, KP13]). Specifically,
we specialize this duality4 by identifying the condition corresponding to axiom E. Moreover, we present a dual
correspondence between the probability distributions on intuitionistic Kripke frames andmeasures on epistemic
Heyting algebras. This correspondence appears in [FGM17] in the context of finite GBL-algebras. Furthermore,
we generalize the model-theoretic constructions presented in Section 2.2 for the Boolean setting and show that
they dually correspond to the constructions presented in Section 4. Finally, notice that these results readily imply
the completeness and the finite model property of IPDEL with respect to this class of relational structures via
the algebraic completeness presented in Appendix C.
Structure of this section. In Section 6.1, we introduce the epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frames as the class
of relational structures dually corresponding to epistemic Heyting algebras. In Section 6.2, we introduce the
probability distributions associated with any agent i and prove that each dually corresponds to an i-measure. In
Section 6.3, we introduce the construction of intermediate epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frames and prove that
it dually corresponds to the construction of intermediate epistemic Heyting algebras presented in Section 4.4. In
Section 6.4, we define the dual construction to the pseudo-quotient defined in 4.5. Finally, in Section 6.5 we use
this construction to define the interpretation of IPDEL-formulas on IPDEL-models.
6.1 Epistemic Heyting algebras and epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frames
We first recall the definition on the objects of the duality between finite monadic Heyting algebras and MIPC-
frames5. We then identify the MIPC-frames corresponding to epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frames and show
that their dual algebras exactly correspond to epistemic Heyting algebras.
Definition 6.1 (Finite MIPC-frames). A finite MIPC-frame is a tuple
F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉
such that (S, ≤) is a finite poset and each Ri is an equivalence relation on S such that
(Ri◦ ≥) ⊆ (≥ ◦ Ri ) Ri = (≥ ◦ Ri ) ∩ (Ri◦ ≤).
4Because we consider only finite algebras and finite relational structures we can dispense with the topology.
5A complete exposition can be found in [Bez99].
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Notation 5. For any poset (S, ≤) and any set X ⊆ S , we define the downset and the upset generated by X as
X↓ = {w ∈ S | ∃v ∈ X ,w ≤ v} and X↑ = {w ∈ S | ∃v ∈ Xw ≥ v}
respectively. We let P↓(S) = {X↓ | X ⊆ S} be the set of all downsets of S .
Definition 6.2 (Complex algebra of a finite MIPC-frame). For any finite MIPC-frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, let its
complex algebra be:
F
+
= (P↓(S),∧,∨,→, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag,⊥)
where
X ∧ Y := X ∩Y , (6.1)
X ∨ Y := X ∪Y , (6.2)
X → Y := S \ ((X ∩ (S \ Y )) ↑), (6.3)
♦iX := R
−1
i [X ], (6.4)
iX := S \ (≥ ◦ Ri )
−1[S \ X ], (6.5)
⊥ := ∅. (6.6)
We also use the standard notation
⊤ := S, (6.7)
¬X := X → ⊥ = S \ X↑ . (6.8)
Definition 6.3 (MIPC frame associated to a finite monadic Heyting algebra). For any finite monadic Heyting
algebra6 A = (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag), let its associated frame be:
A+ = 〈J(A), ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉
where
• J(A) is the set of join-irreducible elements of A;
• ≤ ⊆ J(A) × J(A) is the order inherited from A, i.e. j ≤ j ′ iff j ≤A j ′ for all j, j ′ ∈ J(A);
• Ri ⊆ J(A) × J(A) is defined as follows: jRi j ′ if and only if ♦i j = ♦i j ′ for all j, j ′ ∈ J(A) and every
i ∈ Ag.
The following lemma is stated in [KP13, Fact 20,Proposition 21] and [Bez99]:
Lemma 6.4. If F is a finite MIPC-frame, then F+ is a finite monadic Heyting algebra. If A is a finite monadic
Heyting algebra then A+ is a finite MIPC-frame. Furthermore (F
+)+  F and (A+)
+
 A.
Notation 6. Let η : A→ (A+)+ and ϵ : F→ (F+)+ denote the natural isomorphisms inherited from the object
dualities (A+)
+
 A and (F+)+  F. (see [DP02] for more details on η and ϵ .)
Definition 6.5 (Epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame). An epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame is a finite MIPC-
frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉 such that, for every i ∈ Ag, the equivalence relation Ri is upwards and downwards
closed w.r.t. the order relation ≤.
The following lemma characterises the dual spaces of epistemic Heyting algebras7:
Lemma 6.6. If A is an epistemic Heyting algebra, then A+ is an epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame. If F is an
epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame, then F+ is an epistemic Heyting algebra.
6see Theorem 4.1, page 11.
7see Theorem 4.3, page 12.
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Proof. Since, by definition, all epistemic Heyting algebras are finite monadic Heyting algebras, it follows
from Theorem 6.4 that their dual spaces are finite MIPC-frames.
Let A = (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag) and A+ = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉. By Theorem 6.4, it is enough to show that the
equivalence relations Ri are upwards and downwards closed. Since Ri is symmetric it is enough to show that Ri
is upwards closed.
Assume, for contradiction, that the equivalence relation Ri is not upwards closed for some i ∈ Ag. Hence,
there is at least one equivalence class defined by the relation Ri that is not upwards closed. Since the empty set
is upwards and downwards closed, this equivalence class is non-empty. Let w ∈ S be an element of that class,
let v ∈ S be such that v ≥ w and v < Ri [w], and let a be the element of the dual algebra corresponding to the
downset generated by w . Then ♦ia = R−1i [w↓].
First, let us show that v < R−1i [w↓]. Heading towards a contradiction, let us assume that v ∈ R
−1
i [w↓]. This
means that there exists z ∈ S such that z ≤ w and (v, z) ∈ Ri , therefore (v,w) ∈ (Ri◦ ≤). Furthermore, we have
that (v,w) ∈ (≥ ◦ Ri ), because (w,w) ∈ Ri and v ≥ w . Since Ri = (≥ ◦ Ri ) ∩ (Ri◦ ≤), we deduce that (v,w) ∈ Ri ,
which is a contradiction. This proves that v < R−1i [w↓].
From (6.8), we have that ¬♦ia = S \ ((R−1[w↓])↑). By assumption,w ≤ v , hence v ∈ (R−1[w↓])↑ and v < ¬♦ia.
Hencev < ♦ia∨¬♦ia, and therefore axiom E does not hold, contradicting the assumption thatA is an epistemic
Heyting algebra. Hence, Ri is upwards closed.
As to the second part of the statement, let F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉 and F+ = (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag). By Theorem 6.4,
it remains to prove that F+ satisfies axiom E (i.e. ♦ia ∨ ¬♦ia = ⊤) for every i ∈ Ag. Since Ri is upwards closed
for every i ∈ Ag, it follows that (R−1i [X↓])↑ = R
−1
i [X↓]. Therefore R
−1
i [X↓] ∪ (S \ ((R
−1
i [X↓])↑) = S , i.e. axiom E
holds in F+, as required. 
Definition 6.7 (Epistemic intuitionistic Kripke model). An epistemic intuitionistic Kripke model is a tuple M =
〈F,V 〉 such that F is an epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame and V : AtProp → P↓(S).
Corollary 6.8. For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, the i-minimal elements of F
+
are exactly the equivalence cells of Ri .
Proof. Recall (cf. Theorem 4.2) that an element a ∈ F+ is i-minimal if
(1) a , ⊥,
(2) ♦ia = a and
(3) if b ∈ F+, b < a and ♦ib = b, then b = ⊥.
Let X ⊆ S be an Ri -equivalence cell of F. Hence, X is a non-empty set, which proves item (1). Moreover, by
definition of ♦ (see (6.4)), we have ♦iX := R−1i [X ] = X , which proves item (2). Finally, if ∅ , Y ⊆ X then
♦iY = R
−1
i [Y ] = X , which proves item (3).
Let a ∈ F+ = P↓(S) be an i-minimal element. To prove that a is an equivalence cell of Ri , we need to show
that a = R−1i [w] for some w ∈ S . By item 1, a , ∅; hence, there exists w ∈ a. Recall that ♦iX := R
−1
i [X ] (see
(6.4)). By item 2, a = ♦ia = R−1i [a]; hence, a is the union of equivalence cells. By item 3, the only equivalence cell
or union of equivalence cells smaller than a is the empty set; hence, a contains exactly one equivalence cell. 
Corollary 6.9. For every epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, and every join-prime ele-
ment j of F+, there exists some i-minimal element a such that j ≤ a.
Proof. If j is a join-prime element of F+, then j = w↓ for somew ∈ S . Let a = R−1i [w], which is an i-minimal
element by Corollary 6.8. Since the equivalence relation Ri is upwards and downwards closed for every i ∈ Ag,
we havew↓ ⊆ R−1i [w], as required. 
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6.2 Epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frames and probabilities
In this section, we define i-probability distributions. Applying ideas of [FGM17] to the setting of epistemic
Heyting algebras, we define a correspondence between maps from epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frames to
non-negative reals and premeasures on epistemic Heyting algebras (see Definition 4.6).
Definition 6.10 (i-probability distribution). Let F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉 be an epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame.
An i-probability distribution over S is a map Pi : S → ]0, 1] such that
∑
w ∈X Pi (w) = 1 for each equivalence cell
X of Ri .
Lemma 6.11. For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, any map f : S → R+ defines the
i-premeasure f + on F+ as follows:
f + : Mini (A)↓ → R
+ (6.9)
a 7→
∑
x ∈a
Pi (x).
Moreover, if f is an i-probability distribution, then the map f + is an i-measure (see Theorem 4.6) on F+.
Proof. This result directly follows from the definition of f + and Theorem 6.8. 
Definition 6.12. For any finite monadic Heyting algebra A = (L, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag) and any i-premeasure µi
on A, let
(µi )+ : J(A) → R
+ (6.10)
b 7→ µi (b) − µi
(∨
c<b
c
)
.
It follows from the monotonicity of µi that (µi )+ is well-defined.
Lemma 6.13. Let A be an epistemic Heyting algebra equipped with an i-premeasure µi . Let the map η : A →
(A+)
+ be the natural isomorphism (see 6). Then, ((µi )+)
+(η(a)) = µi (a) for every a ∈ A.
Proof. Notice that, by definition,
((µi )+)
+ ◦ η : Mini (A)↓ → R
+
b 7→
∑
x ∈b
(µi )+(x) =
∑
x ∈b
(
µi (x) − µi
(∨
c<x
c
))
.
Since A is a finite poset, we can define the height of its elements as follows: for every a ∈ A,
h(a) :=
{
0 if a = ⊥
max{h(b) | b < a} + 1 otherwise.
Notice that the only element of height 0 is ⊥. The proof will proceed by induction on the height of the elements
of A below the i-minimal elements.
As to the base case, it is immediate to see that ((µi )+)+(η(⊥)) = ((µi )+)+(∅) = µi (⊥) = 0.
As to the induction step, assume that µi (a) = ((µi )+)+(η(a)) for all a ∈ Mini (A) such that h(a) ≤ n. Now, let b
be such that h(b) = n + 1. If b is a join prime element of A, then η(b) = b↓ and by definition (
∨
c<b c) < b. This
implies that h (
∨
c<b c) < h(b). Hence, by induction hypothesis,
µi
(∨
c<b
c
)
= ((µi )+)
+
(
η
(∨
c<b
c
))
= ((µi )+)
+ (b↓ \ {b}) .
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Therefore,
((µi )+)
+(b↓) =
∑
x ∈b↓
((µi )+)(x)
= ((µi )+)(b) +
∑
x ∈b↓\{b }
((µi )+)(x)
= ((µi )+)(b) + ((µi )+)
+(b ↓ \{b})
= µi (b) − µi
(∨
c<b
c
)
+ ((µi )+)
+
(
η
(∨
c<b
c
))
= µi (b). (by induction hypothesis)
If b is not a join prime element then it can be written as the union of elements strictly below it. Since both µi
and ((µi )+)+ satisfy condition 3 of Definition 4.6 and have the same values on elements of height strictly smaller
than n + 1, it follows that µi (b) = ((µi )+)+(η(b)). 
Corollary 6.14. Let A be an epistemic Heyting algebra equiped with an i-measure µi : Mini (A)↓ → R+. Then
the map
(µi )+ : J(A) → ]0, 1] (6.11)
a 7→ µi (a) − µi
(∨
b<a
b
)
is an i-probability distribution over A+.
Proof. The map (µi )+ is well-defined. Indeed, (µi )+(b) is strictly positive for any b ∈ J(A), because µi is
strictly monotone (see Theorem 4.6 item 6) and (µi )+(b) ≤ 1, because there exists an i-minimal element a such
that b ≤ a (see Theorem 6.9) and because µi (a) = 1 (see Theorem 4.6 item 5). Theorem 6.13 implies that 1 =
µi (a) = ((µi )+)
+(a) =
∑
x ∈X (µi )+(x) for every i-minimal element a, which shows that (µi )+ is an i-probability
distribution over A+, as required. 
Lemma 6.15. Let F be an epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame equipped with a probability distribution Pi . Let
the map ϵ : F→ (F+)+ be the natural isomorphism (see 6). Then ((Pi )+)+(ϵ(w)) = Pi (w) for every w ∈ F.
Proof. For every join prime elementw↓ of F+, we have that v ∈ w↓ if and only if v ≤ w . Thus we obtain:
((Pi )
+)+(ϵ(w)) = (Pi )
+(w↓) − (Pi )
+ ©­«
∨
b<w ↓
b
ª®¬ =
∑
v≤w
Pi (v) −
∑
v<w
Pi (v) = Pi (w).

6.3 Dualizing the product updates of APE structures
In this section, we introduce the generalization of the construction of the intermediate structure presented in
Section 2.2, and show that it dualizes the intermediate construction on algebras presented in Section 4.4.
Definition 6.16 (Intermediate intuitionistic structure). For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke modelM = 〈S, ≤
, (Ri )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉 and any intuitionistic probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over L
(see Theorem 5.2), let the intermediate intuitionistic structure ofM and E be the tuple:
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∐
E
M := 〈
∐
|E |
S, ≤
∐
, (R
∐
i )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
∐〉
where
•
∐
|E | S  S × E is the |E |-fold coproduct of S ,
• the order relation ≤
∐
on
∐
|E | S is defined as follows:
(s, e) ≤
∐
i (s
′
, e ′) iff s ≤i s
′ and e = e ′,
• each binary relation R
∐
i on
∐
|E | S is defined as follows:
(s, e)R
∐
i (s
′
, e ′) iff sRis
′ and e ∼i e
′
,
• and the valuation [[·]]∐ : AtProp → PS is defined by
[[p]]∐ := {(s, e) | s ∈ [[p]]M} = [[p]]M × E
for every p ∈ AtProp.
For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke modelM = 〈F, [[·]]〉, let∐
E
F := 〈
∐
|E |
S, ≤
∐
, (R
∐
i )i ∈Ag〉.
Lemma 6.17. LetM = 〈F, [[·]]〉 be an epistemic intuitionistic Kripke model. Then (
∐
EF, [[·]]
∐) is also an epistemic
intuitionistic Kripke model. Moreover, (
∐
EF)
+
=
∏
EE
(F+).
Proof. Given [KP13, Fact 23], Theorem 6.4 and Theorem 6.6, it remains to show that each R
∐
i is upwards
closed. This follows from each Ri being upwards closed and the definition of ≤
∐
. 
Definition 6.18. For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, any epistemic intuitionistic
Kripke model M = 〈F, [[·]]〉, any i-probability distribution Pi on F (see Theorem 6.10), and any intuitionistic
probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i)i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over L, let us define the function P
∐
i : S ×
E → R+ by recursion on the order ≤
∐
as follows:
P
∐
i (w, e) =
©­«
∑
φ∈Φ
Pi (e) · P
φ
i (w) · pre(e | φ)
ª®¬ −
∑
v<w
P
∐
i (v, e) (6.12)
where
P
φ
i (w) =
∑
v≤w
{
Pi (v)
M,v |= φ and M,v 2 ψ for allψ ∈ mb([[φ]])}. (6.13)
Recall that mb(a) denotes the multiset of the ≺-maximal elements of Φ ≺-below a (see Theorem 4.15).
Lemma 6.19. For every M, Pi and E as in Theorem 6.18 and for every w ∈ S ,
P
φ
i (w) = ((Pi )
+)[[φ]](w ↓). (6.14)
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Proof.
P
φ
i (w) =
∑
v≤w
{
Pi (v)
M,v |= φ and M,v 2 ψ for allψ ∈ mb([[φ]])}
=
∑
v≤w
{
Pi (v)
 M ,v |= φ} − ∑
v≤w
{
Pi (v)
M ,v |= ∨
[[ψ ]]∈mb([[φ]])
ψ
}
= (Pi )
+(w ↓ ∧[[φ]]) − (Pi )
+(w ↓ ∧
∨
[[ψ ]]∈mb([[φ]])
[[ψ ]]) (see Theorem 6.11 and equation (6.9))
= ((Pi )
+)[[φ]](w ↓). (see Theorem 4.15 and equation (4.2))

Lemma 6.20. For every M, Pi and E as in Theorem 6.18,
(P
∐
i )
+
= ((Pi )
+)′.
Proof. Recall that
((Pi )
+)′ : Mini (
∏
E
A)↓ → R+ (see Theorem 4.17)
f 7→
∑
e ∈E
∑
a∈Φ
Pi (e) · µ
a
i (f (e)) · pre(e | a).
By Theorem 6.13 and Theorem 6.15, it is enough to show that P
∐
i = (((Pi )
+)′)+. We show this by induction on
the well-founded order ≤
∐
.
The induction hypothesis, for an element f ∈ Mini (
∏
EA)↓ is
((Pi )
+)′(f ) = (P
∐
i )
+(f ) =
∑
v<w
P
∐
i (v, e). (IHf )
The case where f = ⊥ is trivially true. Notice that the element (w, e)↓ corresponds to the map д(w,e ) : E → S
such that д(w,e )(e) = w ↓ and д(w,e )(e
′) = ∅ for every e ′ , e . Hence, we have:
((Pi )
+)′(д(w,e )) =
∑
φ∈Φ
Pi (e) · (P
+
i )
[[φ]](w ↓) · pre(e | [[φ]])
=
∑
φ∈Φ
Pi (e) · P
φ
i (w) · pre(e | φ) (Theorem 6.19 and (4.4))
Notice that
(((Pi )
+)′)+((w, e)) = ((Pi )
+)′(д(w,e )) − ((Pi )
+)′(f ) (see Theorem 6.12)
with f (e) = w↓ \ {w} and f (e ′) = ∅ for e ′ , e .
Notice that f < д. Hence, by the induction hypothesis on f , we have
((Pi )
+)′(f ) = (P
∐
i )
+(f ) =
∑
v<w
P
∐
i (v, e).
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Hence, we get
(((Pi )
+)′)+((w, e)) = ((Pi )
+)′(д(w,e )) −
∑
v<w
P
∐
i (v, e)
=
∑
φ∈Φ
Pi (e) · P
φ
i (w) · pre(e | φ) −
∑
v<w
P
∐
i (v, e)
= P
∐
i ((w, e)). (see Theorem 6.18)

6.4 Dualizing the updated APE structures
In the present section, we introduce the generalization of the construction of the update model presented in
Section 2.2 and show that it dualizes the construction of the updated APE structure presented in Section 4.5.
Definition 6.21. For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, any epistemic intuitionistic
KripkemodelM = 〈F, [[·]]〉 and any intuitionistic probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i)i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub)
over L, let
pre : E → L
e 7→
∨
{ϕ ∈ Φ | pre(e | ϕ) , 0} .
Definition 6.22 (Updated intuitionistic structure). For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke model M = 〈S, ≤
, (Ri )i ∈Ag, [[·]]〉 and any intuitionistic probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over L
(see Theorem 6.10), let the updated intuitionistic structure ofM and E be the tuple:
M
E := 〈SE , ≤E , (REi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
E〉
where
• SE = {(w, e) ∈
∐
|E | S | M,w |= pre(e)},
• ≤E=≤
∐
∩ (SE × SE),
• REi = R
∐
i ∩ (S
E × SE) for each i ∈ Ag,
• [[·]]E : AtProp → PS is defined by
[[p]]E :=
{
(w, e) ∈ SE | M,w |= sub(e)(p)
}
for every p ∈ AtProp.
For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke modelM = 〈F, [[·]]〉, let
F
E := 〈SE , ≤E , (REi )i ∈Ag〉.
Lemma 6.23. IfM = 〈F, [[·]]〉 is an epistemic intuitionistic Kripkemodel, then so isME . Moreover, (F
E)+ = (F+)E
E
.
Proof. It follows from [KP13, Definition 22,Fact 23] and Lemma 6.17. 
Definition 6.24. For any epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frame F = 〈S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag〉, any epistemic intuitionistic
Kripke model M = 〈F, [[·]]〉, any i-probability distribution Pi on F (see Theorem 6.10), and any intuitionistic
probabilistic event structure E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre, sub) over L, the updated i-probability distribution
P Ei : S
E → ]0, 1] is defined as follows:
P Ei (w, e) :=
P
∐
i (w, e)∑
{P
∐
i (w
′, e ′) | (w ′, e ′)REi (w, e)}
(6.15)
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where P
∐
i is as for Theorem 6.18.
Lemma 6.25. For every M, Pi and E as in Theorem 6.24,
(P Ei )
+
= ((Pi )
+)EE .
Proof. By Theorem 6.8 and Theorem 6.17 the i-minimal elements of (ME)+ are the equivalence cells of
Ri . Now, let д ∈ (ME)+, f the i-minimal element above д and (w, e) ∈ д. By Theorem 6.20
∑
{P
∐
i (w
′
, e ′) |
(w ′, e ′)REi (w, e)} = (P
∐
i )
+(f ) and
∑
(w ′,e ′)∈д P
∐
i (w
′
, e ′) = (P
∐
i )
+(д). Therefore:
((Pi )
+)EE (д) =
(P
∐
i )
+(д)
(P
∐
i )
+(f )
=
∑
(w ′,e ′)∈д P
∐
i (w
′
, e ′)∑
{P
∐
i (w
′, e ′) | (w ′, e ′)REi (w, e)}
=
∑
(w ′,e ′)∈д
P
∐
i (w
′
, e ′)∑
{P
∐
i (w
′, e ′) | (w ′, e ′)REi (w, e)}
=
∑
(w ′,e ′)∈д
P Ei (w, e)
= (P Ei )
+(д).

6.5 Relational semantics for IPDEL
Definition 6.26. An IPDEL-model is a structure N =
〈
M, (Pi )i ∈Ag
〉
such that M =
〈
S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
is an
epistemic intuitionistc Kripke model, and Pi is a probability distribution over S for every i ∈ Ag. For every
IPDEL-model N and every event structure E, we let NE =
〈
M
E
, (P Ei )i ∈Ag
〉
(cf. Definitions 6.22 and 6.24).
It can be verified straightforwardly that for every IPDEL-model N and every event structure E, the structure
N
E is an IPDEL-model.
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Definition 6.27 (Semantics of IPDEL). For every IPDEL-modelN =
〈
M, (Pi )i ∈Ag
〉
whereM =
〈
S, ≤, (Ri )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
the IPDEL-formulas are interpreted on N as follows:
N, s |= ⊥ iff never
N, s |= p iff s ∈ [[p]]
N, s |= ϕ ∧ψ iff N, s |= ϕ and N, s |= ψ
N, s |= ϕ ∨ψ iff N, s |= ϕ or N, s |= ψ
N, s |= ϕ → ψ iff N, s ′ |= ϕ implies N, s ′ |= ψ for every s ′ ≤ s
N, s |= ♦iϕ iff there exists s
′Ris such that N, s
′ |= ϕ
N, s |= iϕ iff N, s
′ |= ϕ for all s ′(≥ ◦ Ri )s
N, s |= 〈E, e〉ϕ iff N, s |= pre(e) and NE , (s, e) |= ϕ
N, s |= [E, e]ϕ iff N, s |= pre(e) implies NE , (s, e) |= ϕ
N, s |=
(
n∑
k=1
αk µi (φ)
)
≥ β iff
n∑
k=1
αk (Pi )
+([[φ]] ∩ Ri [s]) ≥ β .
Recalling that in epistemic intuitionistic Kripke frames, and hence on IPDEL-models, the relations Ri are both
upwards and downwards closed, this implies that the seventh clause in the definition above can be simplified as
follows:
N, s |= iϕ iff N, s
′ |= ϕ for all s ′Ris .
7 CASE STUDY: DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
In the present section, we illustrate the relational semantic update process described in Section 6 by means of a
case study that involves the assessment of the likelihood of a socially constructed event (a bankruptcy), taking
place at some point in the future.
The focal feature of the case study is that this assessment depends to a greater extent on the actions, beliefs
and expectations of the agents than on factual information.
In what follows, we first present the case study informally, and then we introduce a simplified formalization of
the problem using probabilistic epistemic intuitionistic Kripke models and probabilistic intuitionistic epistemic
event structures.
7.1 Informal presentation
Around 1950, there was a small businessman w in Amsterdam whose main business was to sell the products of
foreign textile manufacturers to Dutch clothing firms. Like most small businessmen in Amsterdam at the time,
he banked with the Amsterdamsche Bank (which later became the present ABN AMRO).
One day,w received an invitation to lunch with one of the directors of that bank. This invitation puzzled him
a great deal, because he did not know this director personally, and a small businessman like him usually only
dealt with bank employees at much lower levels. However, he accepted the invitation and showed up for the
lunch at the top floor of the bank’s headquarters, in the city centre.
During the copious lunch, the bank director talked about all kinds of general subjects and askedw ’s opinion
about the economic climate in Amsterdam. Rather than being flattered, w found it hard to imagine he was
invited to provide opinions about matters the bank knew better than he. When the dessert was served, the
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banker mentioned aside some other matter the name of a certain Amsterdam firm f , which was an important
client ofw . This firm, the bank director said, was doing very well under the present solid leadership.
The small businessman realised that this must have been the point of the whole lunch. And if this large bank
went to so much effort to increase the confidence of one small businessman in this firm, it must have been very
important to the bank thatw believed that f was doing well.
The small businessman said he wanted to wash his hands, although coffee still needed to be served, but instead
of walking to the bathroom he ran down the stairs and on the street to find a telephone booth and call to the
office to stop all deliveries to f and also claim back any supplies that had already been delivered.
Two weeks later, f went bankrupt and it turned out that the bank not only was its major creditor but also
had preferential right to sell off any stocks in the possession of f to pay back the debt to the bank before other
creditors would be satisfied.
7.2 Analysis of the situation
Let Bf be the following proposition:
‘Firm f will bankrupt within a month.’
Notice that, while being two-valued, intuitionistic logic allows for Bf to be either true, or false, or undecided in
a model, and the availability of the third option seems to adequately reflect real-life situations. Indeed, there is a
strict judicial procedure which establishes the truth of Bf , and when this procedure is not (yet) in place it seems
reasonable to not assign it a truth value.
Accordingly, the sum of the probability attributed to Bf byw and the probability attributed to ¬Bf byw does
not need to be 1.
For simplicity we regard everything which happened from the invitation to the banker’s utterance about firm
f as one single event. We also propose that the uncertainty ofw concerns how to interpret this event, and very
much simplifying this story, the two mutually inconsistent interpretations of this event are
e1:‘The banker is trying to manipulate my opinions.’
e2:‘The banker only wants to exchange information.’
The uncertainty of w about how to interpret the event is encoded in the shape of the event structure, which
consists of two states, corresponding to e1 and e2 above respectively, to each of whichw assigns his (subjective)
probability.
For the sake of illustrating how the substitution map works and to simplify the subsequent treatment we also
include the following atomic proposition M in our language, the intended meaning of which is:
‘The banker is manipulative.’
7.3 Formalization: initial model and event structure
Let the set of atomic propositions be AtProp := {Bf , M} as discussed above.
Initial model. In the formalization discussed below, we only consider the viewpoint of agentw ; hence, in the
model and the event structure we specify only the subjective probabilities of agentw . The initial model is
M := 〈S, ≤,∼w , Pw , [[·]]〉
with:
• S := {s0, s1, s2},
• ≤ := {(s, s) | s ∈ S} ∪ {(s1, s0), (s2, s0)},
• ∼w := S × S ,
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s2, 0.8 : ¬Bfs1, 0.1 : Bf
s0, 0.1
Fig. 2. Initial modelM
e1
0.95 0.05
e2
Fig. 3. Event structure E
• Pw : S → ]0, 1] with
Pw (s0) := 0.1, Pw (s1) := 0.1, Pw (s2) := 0.8,
• [[·]] : AtProp → PS is such that [[Bf ]] := {s1} and [[M]] := ⊥.
This model represents a situation in whichw has no additional information about the financial health of firm
f . Hence, we assume that the probability assigned by w to each state of the model reflects the average risk of
bankruptcy of firms in that industry during that period. For w to be willing to do business with f it is not just
enough that f does not have a higher probability of bankruptcy than the average firm, but also the probability
of being in an uncertain state should be low. The modelM is drawn in Figure 2.
Event structure. We consider the following pointed event structure:
(E, e1) := (E,∼w , Pw ,Φ, pre, sub)
where
• E := {e1, e2},
• ∼w := E × E,
• Pw (e1) = 0.95 and Pw (e2) = 0.05,
• Φ = {⊤, Bf ,¬Bf },
• pre : E × Φ→ [0, 1] is given in Figure 4.
• the definition of the map sub : E × {M} → L is given in Figure 5,
where e1 and e2 correspond to the two interpretations of the event discussed in the previous section. The event
structure E is partially represented in Figure 3.
By stipulating that Pw (e1) = 0.95 and Pw (e2) = 0.05, we indicate thatw believes that it is far more likely that
the banker is trying to manipulate his opinion on f .
The map pre provides the objective probability pre(e | ϕ) of each event e ∈ E happening when one assumes
that the formula ϕ ∈ Φ holds. Each line of Figure 4 gives the probability distribution pre(• | ϕ) : E × [0, 1] for
each ϕ ∈ Φ. The values in Figure 4 are based on the following assumptions:
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e1 e2
⊤ 0.8 0.2
Bf 0.99 0.01
¬Bf 0.05 0.95
Fig. 4. The map pre
e1 e2
M ⊤ ⊥
Fig. 5. The map sub
¬BfBf
⊤
Fig. 6. The partial order given by (Φ,→)
• If we consider the row where ϕ = ⊤, which corresponds to the state in which the bankruptcy of f is
undetermined, it is reasonable to assume that the probability of e1, namely the banker trying to manipulate
w ’s opinion on f , is significantly higher than that of e2.
• If we consider the row where ϕ = Bf , which corresponds to the state in which f is going to be bankrupt
within a month, it is reasonable to regard e1 as almost certain.
• If we consider the row where ϕ = ¬Bf , which corresponds to the state in which f is financially healthy
then it is reasonable to assign a very low probability to the event in which the banker wants to manipulate
w ’s opinion about f , since the banker has nothing to gain from it.
Remark 18. The poset Φ ordered by logical implication is a tree and is drawn in Figure 6.
7.4 Updated model
In this section, we show how the initial model described in the section above is updated with the event structure.
The updated model
M
(E,e1) :=
〈
S ′, ≤′,∼′w , P
′
w , [[·]]
′
〉
is defined as follows:
• S ′ := S × E,
• (s, e) ≤′ (s ′, e ′) iff s ≤ s ′ and e = e ′ for all (s, e), (s ′, e ′) ∈ S ′,
• (s, e) ∼′w (s
′
, e ′) iff s ∼w s ′ and e ∼w e ′ for all (s, e), (s ′, e ′) ∈ S ′,
• the map P ′w is shown in Figure 7, where the actual values are rounded off,
• the map [[·]]′ : AtProp → PS ′ is defined as follows:
[[Bf ]]
′ := [[Bf ]] × E;
[[M]]′ := ([[sub(e1, M)]] × {e1}) ∪ ([[sub(e2, M)]] × {e2})
= {(s0, e1), (s1, e1), (s2, e1)}.
The updated modelM(E,e1) is drawn in Figure 7.
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(s2, e1), 0.15 : ¬Bf , M(s1, e1), 0.3848 : Bf , M
(s0, e1), 0.31 : M
(s2, e2), 0.15 : ¬Bf , ¬M(s1, e2), 0.0002 : Bf , ¬M
(s0, e2), 0.005 : ¬M
Fig. 7. Updated modelME
As expected, the fact that w assigns a much greater probability to e1 than e2 implies that the probabilistic
weight of the model above is concentrated among the three leftmost states. Of these three states, the weight is
shared almost equally between the two in which Bf is either true or undecided, which reverses the subjective
probability assigned in the initial model. This reversal capturesw ’s decision to abruptly stop all deliveries to f .
7.5 Syntactic inference of a property of the aernoon event
In the present section, wewill use the Hilbert style presentation of IPDEL to derive the formula (7.1). This formula
gives the threshold of reasonable optimism which enables w to revise his subjective probability about Bf after
the afternoon event (E, e1) takes place. Specifically, the probability w assigns to Bf should not be less than 19.8
times that he assigns to ¬Bf in order for the event (E, e1) as specified in the sections above to be enough forw
to revert his judgment about Bf .
Proposition 7.1. The formula
(19.8µw (Bf ) > µw (¬Bf )) ↔ [E, e1](µw (M ∧ Bf ) > µw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf )), (7.1)
where αµi (φ) > βµi (ψ ) is shorthand for (βµi (ψ ) ≥ αµi (φ)) → ⊥, is derivable in IPDEL.
Proof. In order to show the equivalence (7.1), we will use the IPDEL axioms to equivalently rewrite its right-
hand side into its left-hand side.
[E, e1](µw (M ∧ Bf ) > µw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ))
iff [E, e1]
(
(µw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ≥ µw (M ∧ Bf )) → ⊥
)
(notation for >)
iff 〈E, e1〉(µw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ≥ µw (M ∧ Bf )) → 〈E, e1〉⊥ (I11 in Table 2)
iff 〈E, e1〉(µw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ≥ µw (M ∧ Bf )) → ⊥ (I6 in Table 2)
In what follows we focus on equivalently rewriting the antecedent of the implication above.
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〈E, e1〉(µw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ≥ µw (M ∧ Bf ))
iff
∑
e ′∈E
ϕ ∈Φ
Pw (e
′) · pre(e ′ | ϕ) · µ
ϕ
w (〈E, e
′〉(¬M ∧ ¬Bf )) ≥
∑
e ′∈E
ϕ ∈Φ
Pw (e
′) · pre(e ′ | ϕ) · µ
ϕ
w (〈E, e
′〉(M ∧ Bf ))
(I18 in Table 2)
iff Pw (e2) · pre(e2 | ¬Bf ) · µw (¬Bf ) ≥ Pw (e1) · pre(e1 | Bf ) · µw (Bf ) (by Lemma 7.2)
iff 0.05 · 0.95 · µw (¬Bf ) ≥ 0.95 · 0.99 · µw (Bf ) (Definition of (E, e1))
iff 0.05 · µw (¬Bf ) ≥ 0.99 · µw (Bf ) (by Lemma C.4)
iff µw (¬Bf ) ≥ 19.8µw (Bf ). (by Lemma C.4)
Hence,
〈E, e1〉(µw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ≥ µw (M ∧ Bf )) → ⊥
iff (µw (¬Bf ) ≥ 19.8µw (Bf )) → ⊥
iff 19.8µw (Bf ) > µw (¬Bf ),
as required. 
Lemma 7.2. The following propositions are provable in IPDEL.
(1) 〈E, e1〉(M ∧ Bf ) ↔ Bf and 〈E, e1〉(¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ↔ ⊥;
(2) 〈E, e2〉(¬M ∧ ¬Bf ) ↔ ¬Bf and 〈E, e2〉(M ∧ Bf ) ↔ ⊥;
(3) µ⊤w (Bf ) = 0 and µ
⊤
w (¬Bf ) = 0;
(4) µ
Bf
w (¬Bf ) = 0 and µ
¬Bf
w (Bf ) = 0;
(5) µ
Bf
w (Bf ) = µw (Bf ) and µ
¬Bf
w (¬Bf ) = µw (¬Bf ).
Proof. Proof of item (1).
〈E, e1〉(M ∧ Bf )
iff 〈E, e1〉M ∧ 〈E, e1〉Bf (I8 in Table 2)
iff pre(e1) ∧ sub(e1, M) ∧ pre(e1) ∧ sub(e1, Bf ) (I2 in Table 2)
iff sub(e1, M) ∧ sub(e1, Bf ) (pre(e1) is ⊤ ∨ Bf ∨ ¬Bf )
iff ⊤ ∧ Bf (Definition of sub)
iff Bf
and
〈E, e1〉(¬M ∧ ¬Bf )
iff 〈E, e1〉¬M ∧ 〈E, e1〉¬Bf (I8 in Table 2)
iff (pre(e1) ∧ (¬〈E, e1〉M)) ∧ (pre(e1) ∧ (¬〈E, e1〉Bf )) (I12 and I6 in Table 2)
iff pre(e1) ∧ ¬(pre(e1) ∧ sub(e1, M)) ∧ pre(e1) ∧ ¬(pre(e1) ∧ sub(e1, Bf )) (I2 in Table 2)
iff ¬sub(e1, M) ∧ ¬sub(e1, Bf ) (pre(e1) is ⊤ ∨ Bf ∨ ¬Bf )
iff ¬⊤ ∧ ¬Bf (Definition of sub)
iff ⊥ (¬⊤ ↔ ⊥)
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article . Publication date: April 2018.
Probabilistic Epistemic Updates on Algebras • :43
Proof of item (2). The proof is similar to that of item 1.
Proof of item (3). Notice that µ⊤w (Bf ) is shorthand for µw (⊤ ∧ Bf ) − (µw (Bf ∧ Bf ) + µw (¬Bf ∧ Bf )) (cf.
Theorem 4.15). Therefore:
µ⊤w (Bf ) = 0
iff µw (⊤ ∧ Bf ) − (µw (Bf ∧ Bf ) + µw (¬Bf ∧ Bf )) = 0
iff µw (⊤ ∧ Bf ) − µw (Bf ∧ Bf ) = 0 (P1 in Table 2 and Lemma C.4)
iff µw (Bf ) − µw (Bf ) = 0.
The last equality follows by N0 in Table 2. The proof of the second inequality is similar.
Proof of item (4). Notice that µ
Bf
w (¬Bf ) is shorthand for µw (Bf ∧ ¬Bf ) and µ
¬Bf
w (Bf ) is shorthand for
µw (¬Bf ∧ Bf ). Hence, the equality follows from Axiom P1 in Table 2.
Proof of item (5).Notice that µ
Bf
w (Bf ) is shorthand for µw (Bf ∧Bf ) and µ
¬Bf
w (¬Bf ) is shorthand for µw (¬Bf ∧
¬Bf ). Hence, the required equality is straightforwardly true.

Since, as discussed in Section 6, IPDEL is sound and complete with respect to the class of relational models,
Proposition 7.1 implies that every IPDEL model M which supports the left-hand side of the equivalence (7.1)
will be updated by the event (E, e1) to a model that satisfies µw (M ∧ Bf ) > µw (¬M ∧ ¬Bf ). Hence, in each such
model agent w will update his subjective probabilities concerning Bf analogously to the model in the example
above (see Section 7.4 and Figure 7).
8 CONCLUSION
Present contributions. In this paper, we have introduced the logic IPDEL, the intuitionistic counterpart of clas-
sical PDEL, as an instance of a general methodology, based on the mathematical construction of updates on
algebras, which makes it possible to define non-classical counterparts of DEL-type logics on different propo-
sitional bases. This methodology makes it possible to also obtain the update construction on relational and
topological models via appropriate (extended) dualities, and hence define relational semantics for the defined
logics. In this way we have shown that IPDEL, which is sound by construction with respect to the class of alge-
braic probabilistic epistemic models (cf. Definition 5.3), is also complete with respect to APE-models and hence
also with respect to their dual relational structures. Since these structures are finite by definition, this result
immediately implies that IPDEL has the finite model property. The logic IPDEL is intended as a tool to analyze
decision-making under uncertainty in situations in which truth is socially constructed and hence decisions are
taken in contexts in which the truth value of certain states of affair might be undetermined. To show IPDEL at
work, we partially formalize one such situation.
Generalizing APE-structures. APE-structures are based on epistemic Heyting algebras (cf. Definition 4.3), the
definition of which requires the image of each diamond operator to have a Boolean algebra structure. Thus, epis-
temic Heyting algebras are a proper subclass of monadic Heyting algebras. This additional condition guarantees
that the i-minimal elements induce a partition on the dual structure of each epistemic Heyting algebra, and hence
that axioms such as µ(⊤) = 1 or (µ(φ) ≥ α) ∨ (µ(φ) < α) are valid. One natural question that presents itself
is whether this condition can be dropped and hence base APE-structures on general monadic Heyting algebras.
Addressing this question requires solving issues of technical and conceptual nature. On the technical side, the
additional requirement plays a role in the completeness theorem, and specifically makes sure that, in the finite
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lattice that we extract from the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra, a sublattice can be defined out of the image of each
diamond (cf. Lemma C.3). This issue would partially be addressed by relaxing the condition that APE-structures
be finite (see paragraph below). On the conceptual side, we would need to restructure the definition of proba-
bilistic measure. The axiom (µ(φ) ≥ α) ∨ (µ(φ) < α) is tightly linked to the metatheory of the real numbers and
in particular to the validity of trichotomy. Hence, in the context of a different metatheory in which trichotomy
does not hold such as the constructive metatheory of real numbers, it seems reasonable that this axiom might
be dropped. However the condition µ(⊤) = 1 expresses the link between probability and the underlying logic.
For this reason this axiom should arguably be kept.
Finite to infinite models. Another natural question is whether we can drop the condition that APE-structures
be finite. A first step would be to investigate the case of APE-structures based on perfect Heyting algebras, i.e.
those Heyting algebras which are isomorphic to algebras of upsets or downsets of given posets. Does every prob-
ability measure on such a Heyting algebra correspond to a discrete probability distribution on the corresponding
dual poset? More generally, possibly infinite APE-structures would dually correspond to relational Esakia spaces
endowed with probability distributions. Are there purely algebraic conditions on probability measures guaran-
teeing that the corresponding probability distribution be discrete?
Proof theory for probabilistic logics. As mentioned in the introduction, the present paper pertains to a line of
research aimed at studying the phenomenon of dynamic (probabilistic epistemic) updates in contexts at odds
with classical truth. The language and semantics of the formal settings previously studied (i.e. those of the
nonclassical versions of PAL and EAK) have served as a basis for a research program in structural proof theory
aimed at developing a uniform methodology for endowing dynamic logics with so-called analytic calculi (see
[CR16, GMP+04]). This research program has successfully addressed PAL and DEL [GKP13, FGK+14c, FGK+14a,
FGK+14b], and PDL [FGKP14], and has been further generalized into the proof-theoretic framework of multi-
type calculi [FGK+14c]. This methodology has been successfully deployed to introduce analytic calculi for logics
particularly impervious to the standard treatment [FGPY36, GPa, GPb, BGP+], and is now ready to be applied to
the issue of endowing PDEL and its non-classical versions with analytic calculi.
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A PROOFS OF SECTION 4
Proof of Lemma 4.8
Lemma 4.8. For any PES-modelM, the i-minimal elements of its complex algebraM+ are exactly the equiva-
lence classes of ∼i .
Proof. LetM =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
be a PES-model andM+ =
(
PS, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag, (P
+
i )i ∈Ag
)
be its
complex algebra. For any i ∈ Ag and any s ∈ S , let [s]i be the ∼i -equivalence cell of s . Fix i ∈ Ag.
First, let us prove that any∼i -equivalence cell corresponds to an i-minimal element ofM+. Since ∼i is reflexive,
[s]i , ∅. Since ∼i is symmetric and transitive, [s]i = ♦i {s} = ♦i♦i {s} = ♦i [s]i . This shows that [s]i is a fixed-
point of ♦i . It remains to show that [s]i is a minimal fixed-point ♦i . Let X ⊆ S be an i-minimal element of
M
+. By definition, we have that X ⊆ [s]i , X , ∅ and ♦iX = X . The assumption that ♦iX = X implies that
X =
⋃
x ∈X ♦i {x} =
⋃
x ∈X [x]i . The assumption that X ⊆ [s]i implies that all x ∈ X must be ∼i -equivalent to
s , and hence to each other. Therefore, X cannot be the union of more than one equivalence cell. Moreover, the
assumption that X , ∅ implies that there exists at least one equivalence cell in
⋃
x ∈X [x]i . This concludes the
proof that, for any s ∈ S , its ∼i -equivalence cell [s]i corresponds to an i-minimal element ofM+, as required.
Now, let us prove that any i-minimal element of M+ correspond to the ∼i -equivalence cell of an element
s ∈ S . Let X be an i-minimal element of M+. The assumption that X = ♦iX implies that X =
⋃
x ∈X [x]i . The
assumption that X , ∅ implies that there exists at least one equivalence cell [s]i in
⋃
x ∈X [x]i . Since [s]i is an
i-minimal element ofM+ and [s]i ⊆ X , we have X = [s]i by minimality of X . 
Proof of Proposition 4.9
Proposition 4.9. For any PES-model M, its complex algebra M+ (see Definition 3.1) is an APE-structure (see
Definition 4.7).
Proof. LetM =
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag, [[·]]
〉
be a PES-model (seeDefinition 2.2) and letM+ =
(
PS, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag, (P
+
i )i ∈Ag
)
be its complex algebra.M+ is an APE-structure if its support is an epistemic Heyting algebra and if each P+i is
an i-measure over
〈
S, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag
〉
. Clearly,
(
PS, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag
)
is an epistemic Heyting algebra (see
Definition 4.3), since ∼i is an equivalence relation and PS is a boolean algebra. To finish the proof we need to
show that each P+i is an i-measure on support(M
+). Hence, for every i ∈ Ag, we need to prove the following
properties:
(a) dom(P+i ) = Mini (support(M
+))↓;
(b) P+i is order-preserving;
(c) for every i-minimal element X ∈ PS and all Y1,Y2 ∈ X↓, we have
P+i (Y1 ∪Y2) = P
+
i (Y1) + P
+
i (Y2) − P
+
i (Y1 ∩ Y2);
(d) P+i (∅) = 0 if dom(P
+
i ) , ∅;
(e) for every i-minimal element X ∈ PS , we have P+i (X ) = 1.
(f) for every i-minimal element X ∈ PS and all Y1,Y2 ∈ X↓ such that Y1 ⊂ Y2, it holds that
P+i (b) < P
+
i (c).
Fix i ∈ Ag.
Proof of (a). By definition, dom(P+i ) = {X ∈ PS | ∃y ∀x (x ∈ X =⇒ x ∼i y)}. Notice that
{X ∈ PS | ∃y ∀x (x ∈ X =⇒ x ∼i y)} = {X | X ⊆ [s] and s ∈ S} .
By Lemma 4.8, we deduce that dom(P+i ) = Mini (support(M
+))↓.
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Proof of (b). Since Pi (s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S , the maps P+i are monotone.
Proof of (c). By Lemma 4.8, if X is an i-minimal element ofM+, then X = [s] for some s ∈ S . If Y1,Y2 ∈ X↓,
then Y1 ∪Y2 ⊆ [s]. Hence,
P+i (Y1 ∪ Y2) =
∑
x ∈Y1∪Y2
Pi (x) (Definition of P+i )
=
∑
x ∈Y1
Pi (x) +
∑
x ∈Y2
Pi (x) −
∑
x ∈Y1∩Y2
Pi (x)
= P+i (Y1) + P
+
i (Y2) − P
+
i (Y1 ∩ Y2). (Definition of P
+
i )
Proof of (d). By definition, P+i (∅) = 0.
Proof of (e). Let X ∈ PS be an i-minimal element. By Lemma 4.8, there exists an s ∈ S such that [s] = X .
Hence, using the definition of Pi (see Definition 3.1), we have:
P+i (X ) =
∑
x ∈[s]
Pi (x) = 1.
Proof of (f). Let X ∈ PS be i-minimal element and Y1,Y2 ∈ X↓ such that Y1 ⊂ Y2. By definition, we have
that
P+i (Y2) =
∑
x ∈Y2
Pi (x) =
∑
x ∈Y1
Pi (x) +
∑
x ∈Y2rY1
Pi (x) = P
+
i (Y1) +
∑
x ∈Y2rY1
Pi (x).
Since Y1 ⊂ Y2, there exists s ∈ Y2 r Y1. Since Pi : S → ]0, 1], we have Pi (s) > 0 for all s ∈ Y2 r Y1. Hence∑
x ∈Y2rY1 Pi (x) > 0 and P
+
i (Y1) < P
+
i (Y2). 
Proof of Proposition 4.14
Proposition 4.14. for every epistemic Heyting algebra A and every agent i ∈ Ag,
Mini (A
′) = { fe,a | e ∈ E and a ∈ Mini (A)},
where for any e ∈ E and a ∈ Mini (A), the map fe,a is defined as follows:
fe,a : E → A
e ′ 7→
{
a if e ′ ∼i e
⊥ otherwise.
Proof. Recall that f ∈ A′ is an i-minimal element (see Theorem 4.2) if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) f , ⊥, (2) ♦i f = f and (3) if д ∈ A, д < f and ♦iд = д, then д = ⊥.
Let us first prove that any map fe,a as above is an i-minimal element of A′. By definition, fe,a(e) = a , ⊥A.
Hence fe,a , ⊥A′ . As to showing that ♦′i fe,a = fe,a , fix e
′ ∈ E, and let us show that (♦′i fe,a)(e
′) = fe,a(e
′). By
definition,
♦′i fe,a(e
′) =
∨
{♦i fe,a(e
′′) | e ′′ ∼i e
′}.
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We proceed by cases: (a) If e ′ ∼i e , then:
♦′i fe,a(e
′) =
∨
{♦i fe,a(e
′′) | e ′′ ∼i e
′} (by definition)
=
∨
{♦ia | e
′′ ∼i e
′} ( fe,a(e ′′) = a, since e ∼i e ′ and ∼i symmetric and transitive)
= ♦ia (the join is nonempty since ∼i is reflexive)
= a (a is i-minimal, hence is a fixed point of ♦i )
= fe,a(e
′). (definition of fe,a and e ′ ∼i e)
(b) If e ′ ≁ e , then:
♦′i fe,a(e
′) =
∨
{♦i fe,a(e
′′) | e ′′ ∼i e
′} (by definition)
=
∨
{♦i⊥ | e
′′ ∼i e
′} (e ≁i e ′)
= ♦i⊥
= ⊥ (♦i⊥ = ⊥)
= fe,a(e
′).
Finally, we need to show that fe,a is a minimal non-bottom fixed-point of ♦′i . Notice preliminarily that if д : E →
A is a fixed point for ♦′i then
д(e) = д(e ′) whenever e ∼i e
′
. (A.1)
Indeed,
д(e) = (♦′iд)(e) =
∨
{♦iд(e
′′) | e ′′ ∼i e} =
∨
{♦iд(e
′′) | e ′′ ∼i e
′} = (♦′iд)(e
′) = д(e ′).
Given that ∼i is reflexive, this implies in particular that, for every e ′ ∈ E,
(♦′iд)(e
′) = ♦iд(e
′). (A.2)
Let д be as above, assume that ⊥ , д ≤ fe,a , and let us show that д = fe,a . Clearly, the assumption д ≤ fe,a
implies that д(e ′) = ⊥ for every e ′ ∈ E such that e ′ ≁i e . Let e ′ ∈ E such that д(e ′) , ⊥. Together with the
assumption that д ≤ fe,a , this implies that fe,a(e ′) , ⊥, hence e ′ ∼i e and ⊥ , д(e ′) ≤ a. To prove that д(e) = a,
by the i-minimality of a it suffices to show that д(e ′) is a fixed point of ♦i . Indeed, by (A.2):
♦iд(e
′) = (♦′iд)(e
′) = д(e ′),
as required. Finally, the fact above and the preliminary observation (A.1) imply that д(e ′) = a for every e ′ ∈ E
such that e ′ ∼i e .
This finishes the proof that fe,a is i-minimal.
Conversely, let д : E → A be i-minimal in A′, and let us show that д = fe,a for some e ∈ E and some i-minimal
element a ∈ A. The assumption that д , ⊥ implies that д(e) , ⊥ for some e ∈ E. Let д(e) = a ∈ A. Then, the
assumption that д = ♦′iд and the observation (A.1) imply that д(e
′) = a for every e ′ ∈ E such that e ′ ∼i e .
Then, the proof is finished if we show that a is i-minimal in A. Indeed, then, by construction we would have
⊥ , fe,a ≤ д, hence the minimality of д would yield fe,a = д.
By definition, we have that a = д(e ′) , ⊥. By observation (A.2),
♦ia = ♦iд(e) = (♦
′
iд)(e) = д(e) = a,
which shows that a is a fixed point of ♦i . Finally, let ⊥ , b ≤ a such that ♦ib = b. Then, with an argument
analogous to the one given above, the map fe,b : E → A would be proven to be a non-bottom fixed-point of ♦′i .
Moreover, fe,b ≤ д, and hence the i-minimality of д would yield fe,b = д, hence a = b. 
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Proof of Proposition 4.16
Proposition 4.16. For every APE-structure F =
(
A, (µi )i ∈Ag
)
and every event structure E over A, µai is an
i-premeasure over A. Furthermore, if a ≤ y then µai (x) = µ
a
i (x ∧ y).
Proof. For every a ∈ Φ and every i ∈ Ag, we want to prove that µai is an i-premeasure over A, hence we need
to prove that µai is a partial function A→ R
+ that satisfies items (1 - 4) of Definition 4.6. Fix a ∈ Φ and i ∈ Ag.
Proof of item 1. We want to prove that dom(µ) = Mini (A)↓. The map µi is an i-premeasure, hence
dom(µi ) = Mini (A)↓. Therefore the map µai is defined on every x ∈ Mini (A)↓ and we can restrict its domain as
follows: dom(µai ) := Mini (A)↓.
Proof that µai is well-defined.We need to prove that µ
a
i (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Mini (A)↓. Recall that Φ
is a finite ordered multiset of elements of A such that, for all distinct b, c ∈ Φ, either b ∧ c = ⊥ or b < c or
c < b (see Definition 4.11 and Remark 13). Hence, for every b, c ∈ mb(a) we have b ∧ c = ⊥. Indeed, by item 2
of Definition 4.10 and what was mentioned above, if b ∧ c , ⊥, then either b ≺ c or c ≺ b. Hence, they cannot
both be maximal.
Fix x ∈ Mini (A)↓. Let us prove by induction on the size of S that for any S ⊆ mb(a),
µi
(∨
b ∈S
x ∧ b
)
=
∑
b ∈S
µi (x ∧ b). (A.3)
Base case : |S | = 0. Assume that S = ∅. Then, we trivially have that
µi (
∨
b ∈S
x ∧ b) = µi (⊥) = 0 =
∑
b ∈S
µi (x ∧ b). (IH0)
Induction step : IHn ⇒ IHn+1. Assume that, for any set S ′ that contains exactly n elements, we have
µi (
∨
b ′∈S ′
x ∧ b ′) =
∑
b ′∈S ′
µi (x ∧ b
′). (IHn)
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Let S contain exactly n + 1 elements, S ′ ⊂ S contain exactly n elements, and S = S ′ ∪ {c}. Let us prove IHn+1:
µi
(∨
b ∈S
x ∧ b
)
= µi
(
(x ∧ c) ∨
∨
b ′∈S ′
(x ∧ b ′)
)
(S = S ′ ∪ {c})
= µi (x ∧ c) + µi
( ∨
b ′∈S ′
x ∧ b ′
)
− µi
(
(x ∧ c) ∧
∨
b ′∈S ′
(x ∧ b ′)
)
(µi is an i-premeasure)
= µi (x ∧ c) + µi
( ∨
b ′∈S ′
x ∧ b ′
)
− µi
( ∨
b ′∈S ′
x ∧ c ∧ x ∧ b ′
)
(∧ distributes over ∨)
= µi (x ∧ c) + µi
( ∨
b ′∈S ′
x ∧ b ′
)
− µi (⊥) (c , b ′ implies c ∧ b ′ = ⊥)
= µi (x ∧ c) +
∑
b ′∈S ′
µi (x ∧ b
′) (µi (⊥) = 0 and (IHn))
=
∑
b ∈S
µi (x ∧ b) (S = S ′ ∪ {c})
By induction, for any x ∈ Mini (A)↓, we have µi
(∨
b ∈mb(a) x ∧ b
)
=
∑
b ∈mb(a) µi (x ∧ b).
Since mb(a) denotes the set of the ≺-maximal elements of (Φ ∩ ↓a) \ {a}, we have that
∨
b ∈mb(a) x ∧b ≤ x ∧a.
By monotonicity of µi , we get that
∑
b ∈mb(a)
µi (x ∧ b) = µi
©­«
∨
b ∈mb(a)
x ∧ b
ª®¬ ≤ µi (x ∧ a).
Hence, µai (x) ≥ 0 for any x ∈ Mini (A)↓ as required.
Proof of item 2. We want to show that µai is order-preserving. Using (A.3) and the fact that ∧ distributes
over ∨, we get that: for any x ∈ Mini (A)↓,
∑
b ∈mb(a)
µi (x ∧ b) = µi
©­«
∨
b ∈mb(a)
x ∧ b
ª®¬ = µi ©­«x ∧
∨
b ∈mb(a)
b
ª®¬ . (A.4)
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Fix x ,y ∈ Mini (A)↓ such that x ≤ y. Notice that
∨
b ∈mb(a) b ≤ a and x ∧ a ∧ y = x . Furthermore, x ∧ a ≤ y ∧ a
and y ∧ (
∨
b ∈mb(a) b) ≤ y ∧ a. Hence (x ∧ a) ∨ (y ∧ (
∨
b ∈mb(a) b)) ≤ y ∧ a. From this we can deduce that:
(x ∧ a) ∨
©­«y ∧ ©­«
∨
b ∈mb(a)
b
ª®¬ª®¬ ≤ y ∧ a
⇒ µi
©­«(x ∧ a) ∨ ©­«y ∧
∨
b ∈mb(a)
b
ª®¬ª®¬ ≤ µi (y ∧ a) (µi is order-preserving)
⇔ µi (x ∧ a) + µi
©­«y ∧
∨
b ∈mb(a)
b
ª®¬ − µi ©­«x ∧ a ∧ y ∧
∨
b ∈mb(a)
b
ª®¬ ≤ µi (y ∧ a) (µi is an i-premeasure)
⇔ µi (x ∧ a) + µi
©­«y ∧
∨
b ∈mb(a)
b
ª®¬ − µi ©­«x ∧
∨
b ∈mb(a)
b
ª®¬ ≤ µi (y ∧ a) (x ∧ a ∧ y = x )
⇔ µi (x ∧ a) − µi
©­«x ∧
∨
b ∈mb(a)
b
ª®¬ ≤ µi (y ∧ a) − µi ©­«y ∧
∨
b ∈mb(a)
b
ª®¬
⇔ µi (x ∧ a) −
∑
b ∈mb(a)
µi (x ∧ b) ≤ µi (y ∧ a) −
∑
b ∈mb(a)
µi (y ∧ b) (by (A.4))
⇔ µai (x) ≤ µ
a
i (y).
Proof of item 3. We need to show that µai (x ∨ y) = µ
a
i (x) + µ
a
i (y) − µ
a
i (x ∧ y) for all x ,y ∈ Mini (A)↓. We
have:
µai (x ∨y) = µi ((x ∨y) ∧ a) −
∑
b ∈mb(a)
µi ((x ∨ y) ∧ b)
= µi ((x ∧ a) ∨ (y ∧ a)) −
∑
b ∈mb(a)
µi ((x ∧ b) ∨ (y ∧ b)) (distributivity)
= (µi (x ∧ a) + µi (y ∧ a) − µi (x ∧ y ∧ a)) −
∑
b ∈mb(a)
(µi (x ∧ b) + µi (y ∧ b) − µi (x ∧ y ∧ b))
(µi is an i-measure)
= µai (x) + µ
a
i (y) − µ
a
i (x ∧ y).
Proof of item 4. If Mini (A)↓ , ∅, it follows from µi (⊥) = 0 (because µi is a i-premeasure) that µai (⊥) =
0. 
Proof of Proposition 4.21
Proposition 4.21. For every PES-modelM and any event structure E over L,
(
∐
E
M)+ 
∏
EE
M
+
.
Proof. The proof that the supports of the two APE-structures (Theorem 4.7) can be identified is essentially
the same as that of [KP13, Fact 23.3], and is omitted. Recall that the basic identification between P(
∐
|E | S) and
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|E | P(S) associates every subset X ⊆
∐
|E | S with the map
д : E → P(S)
e 7→ Xe := {s ∈ S | (s, e) ∈ X }.
Let us prove that this identification induces an identification between the maps8
(P+i )
′ :
∏
|E |
P(S) → [0, 1] and (P
∐
i )
+ : P(
∐
|E |
S) → [0, 1].
In what follows, we fix a subset X ⊆
∐
|E | S in the domain of P
∐
i and let д ∈
∏
|E | P(S) be defined as its
counterpart as discussed above. Recall that for any s ∈ S and e ∈ E, pre(e | s) denotes the value pre(e | ϕ) for the
unique ϕ ∈ Φ such thatM, s  ϕ (see Notation 1). Then, we have:
(P
∐
i )
+(X ) =
∑
(s,e )∈X
P
∐
i ((s, e)) (Definition 3.1 on P
∐
i )
=
∑
(s,e )∈X
Pi (s) · Pi (e) · pre(e | s) (Definition 2.5)
=
∑
e ∈E
∑
s ∈Xe
Pi (s) · Pi (e) · pre(e | s) (Xe := {s ∈ S | (s, e) ∈ X })
=
∑
e ∈E
Pi (e) ·
(∑
s ∈Xe
Pi (s) · pre(e | s)
)
=
∑
e ∈E
Pi (e) ·
∑
ϕ ∈Φ
©­«
∑
s ∈Xe∩[[ϕ ]]
Pi (s) · pre(e | s)
ª®¬ (Φ provides a partition of {s ∈ S | pre(e | s) , 0})
=
∑
e ∈E
Pi (e) ·
©­«
∑
ϕ ∈Φ
©­«
∑
s ∈Xe∩[[ϕ ]]
Pi (s)
ª®¬ · pre(e | ϕ)ª®¬ (Notation 1)
=
∑
e ∈E
Pi (e) ·
©­«
∑
ϕ ∈Φ
P+i (Xe ∩ [[ϕ]]) · preM(e | [[ϕ]])
ª®¬ (Definition 3.1)
=
∑
e ∈E
Pi (e) ·
©­«
∑
ϕ ∈Φ
(P+i )
[[ϕ ]](Xe ) · preM(e | [[ϕ]])
ª®¬ (Remark 15 : mb([[ϕ]]) = ∅)
=
∑
e ∈E
∑
ϕ ∈Φ
Pi (e) · (P
+
i )
[[ϕ ]](Xe ) · preM(e | [[ϕ]])
=
∑
e ∈E
∑
ϕ ∈Φ
Pi (e) · (P
+
i )
[[ϕ ]](д(e)) · pre
M
(e | [[ϕ]])
= (P+i )
′(д) (Definition 4.17 onM+)

8Refer to Definitions 2.5 and 3.1 for the definitions of the intermediate structure
∐
E M and of the complex algebra associated to a model.
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article . Publication date: April 2018.
Probabilistic Epistemic Updates on Algebras • :53
Proof of Lemma 4.26
Lemma 4.26. For any epistemic Heyting algebra A and any a ∈ A, if [b] ∈ Mini (Aa), then ♦i (b ∧ a) is the
unique i-minimal element of A which belongs to [b].
Proof. Let us first prove that ♦i (b ∧ a) ∈ [b]. By assumption, [b] ∈ Mini (Aa), hence [b] = ♦ai [b] = b ∧ a =
♦i (b ∧ a) ∧ a. This implies that ♦i (b ∧ a) ∈ [b].
Now, we need to show that ♦i (b ∧ a) is an i-minimal element of A. Hence, we need to prove that ♦i (b ∧ a)
satisfies items 1, 2, and 3 of Definition 4.2.
Proof of item 1. By assumption, [b] ∈ Mini (Aa), hence [b] , ⊥ and b ∧ a , ⊥. Since ♦i is reflexive
(Definition 4.1, axiom (M1)), ⊥ , b ∧ a ≤ ♦i (b ∧ a), which shows that ♦i (b ∧ a) , ⊥ as required.
Proof of item 2. Since ♦i is transitive (Definition 4.1, axiom (M6)), we have that ♦i (b ∧ a) = ♦i♦i (b ∧ a)
as required.
Proof of item 3. Let c ∈ Mini (A) and c ≤ ♦i (b ∧ a). We need to prove that c = ♦i (b ∧ a). To do so, we
follow the following steps:
(i) we prove that [b] = [c],
(ii) we show that c ∧ a , ⊥,
(iii) we prove that ♦i (b ∧ a).
Step (i). From the assumptions that c ≤ ♦i (b∧a) and that [b] = ♦ai [b], we get that c∧a ≤ ♦i (b∧a)∧a = b∧a,
which proves that [c] ≤ [b].
Step (ii). Since c ≤ ♦i (b ∧ a), we have that c ≤ ♦ia, that is c = c ∧ ♦ia. This gives the following chain of
equalities:
c = c ∧ ♦ia = ♦ic ∧ ♦ia = ♦i (♦ic ∧ a).
The last equality is true in all monadic Heyting algebras (see e.g. [Bez98, Definition 1]). Now, since ♦ic = c , we
get that c = ♦i (c ∧ a), which implies ♦i (c ∧ a) , ⊥ and c ∧ a , ⊥.
Step (iii). By Lemma 4.25, [c] ∈ Mini (Aa). By the i-minimality of [b], we get [b] = [c], that is b ∧a = c ∧a.
Hence ♦i (b ∧ a) = ♦i (c ∧ a) ≤ ♦i (c) = c , which, together with the assumption that c ≤ ♦i (b ∧ a), proves that
♦i (b ∧ a) = c , as required. This finishes the proof that ♦i (b ∧ a) is an i-minimal element of A.
To show the uniqueness, let c1, c2 ∈ [b] and assume that both c1 and c2 are i-minimal elements of A. Then
c1 ∧ a = c2 ∧ a, and hence ♦i (c1 ∧ a) = ♦i (c2 ∧ a). Reasoning as above, one can show that ⊥ , ♦i (c j ∧ a) ≤ c j
and ♦i (c j ∧a) is a fixed point of ♦i for 1 ≤ j ≤ 2. Hence, the i-minimality of c j implies that ♦i (c j ∧a) = c j . Thus,
the following chain of identities holds:
c1 = ♦i (c1 ∧ a) = ♦i (c2 ∧ a) = c2.

Proof of Proposition 4.30
Proposition 4.30. For any APE-structure F and any event structure E over the support of F , the tuple F E =
(AE, (µEi )i ∈Ag) is an APE-structure.
Proof. Let E = (E, (∼i )i ∈Ag, (Pi )i ∈Ag,Φ, pre) be an event structure and F :=
(
A, (µi )i ∈Ag
)
be an APE-structure.
To prove that F E is an APE-structure (see Definition 4.7), we need to prove that AE is an epistemic Heyting
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algebra (see Definition 4.3), and that each map µEi is an i-measure on A
E. By Proposition 4.24, AE is an epistemic
Heyting algebra. Hence, it remains to prove that, for each i ∈ Ag, the map µEi is an i-measure (see Definition 4.6),
i.e. we need to prove that:
(1) dom(µEi ) = Mini (A
E)↓;
(2) µEi is order-preserving;
(3) for every a ∈ Mini (AE) and all b, c ∈ a↓, it holds that µEi (b ∨ c) = µ
E
i (b) + µ
E
i (c) − µ
E
i (b ∧ c);
(4) µEi (⊥) = 0 if dom(µ
E
i ) , ∅;
(5) µEi (a) = 1 for every a ∈ Mini (A
E);
(6) for every a ∈ Mini (AE) and all b, c ∈ a↓ such that b < c , it holds that µEi (b) < µ
E
i (c).
Proof of (1). This condition is satisfied by definition.
The remaining items, are trivially satisfied if the domain of µEi is empty. For the remaining of the proof, let us
assume that the domain of µEi is non-empty.
Proof of item (2). The definition of µ ′i (see Definition 4.17), the Proposition 4.16 and the fact that, if
pre(e | a) , 0, then a ≤ pre(e) (see Definition of pre (4.5)), imply that µ ′i (д) = µ
′
i (д ∧ pre). Assume that
[д1] ≤ [д2] ≤ [fe,a]. This means that д1 ∧ pre ≤ д2 ∧ pre. Since µ ′i is an i-premeasure (Theorem 4.18), it is
monotone. Hence, µ ′i (д1) = µ
′
i (д1 ∧ pre) ≤ µ
′
i (д2 ∧ pre) = µ
′
i (д2). This implies that
µ ′i (д1)
µ ′i (fe,a)
≤
µ ′i (д2)
µ ′i (fe,a)
that is, µEi ([д1]) ≤ µ
E
i ([д2]).
Proof of item (3). Let [д1] and [д2] in F E such that [д1] ≤ [fe,a] and [д2] ≤ [fe,a]. We have:
µEi ([д1] ∨ [д2])
=
µ ′i ((д1 ∧ pre) ∨ (д2 ∧ pre))
µ ′i (fe,a)
=
µ ′i (д1 ∧ pre) + µ
′
i (д2 ∧ pre) − µ
′
i ((д1 ∧ д2) ∧ pre)
µ ′i (fe,a)
(Proposition 4.18. µ ′i is an i-premeasure)
=
µ ′i (д1 ∧ pre)
µ ′i (fe,a)
+
µ ′i (д2 ∧ pre)
µ ′i (fe,a)
−
µ ′i ((д1 ∧ д2) ∧ pre)
µ ′i (fe,a)
=
µ ′i (д1)
µ ′i (fe,a)
+
µ ′i (д2)
µ ′i (fe,a)
−
µ ′i (д1 ∧ д2)
µ ′i (fe,a)
= µEi ([д1]) + µ
E
i ([д2]) − µ
E
i ([д1 ∧ д2]).
Proof of Items (4) and (5). Trivial.
Proof of item (6). Recall that, if [д] , ⊥, then µEi ([д]) > 0 (see Claim in Lemma 4.29). Let ⊥ , [д] < [h].
The monotonicity of the µai guarantees that, for all e ∈ E and a ∈ Φ, we have
Pi (e) · µ
a
i (д(e)) · pre(e |a) ≤ Pi (e) · µ
a
i (h(e)) · pre(e |a).
Furthermore, since [д] < [h], there exists an e ∈ E such that the set
{ a ∈ Φ | pre(e |a) > 0 and д(e) ∧ a < h(e) ∧ a }
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is non-empty. Since Φ is finite, the order ≺ is well-founded and the aforementioned set contains at least one
minimal element. Let a0 be such a minimal element. From Definition 4.11, we have that, pre(e |b) > 0 for all
b ∈ Φ with b ≺ a0. By the minimality of a0, we have that д(e) ∧ b = h(e) ∧ b for all such b ≺ a0. Hence,∑
b ∈mb(a0)
µi (д(e) ∧ b) =
∑
b ∈mb(a0)
µi (h(e) ∧ b)
where mb(a) denotes the multiset of the ≺-maximal elements of Φ ≺-below a (see Theorem 4.15). Since F is an
APE-structure, µi is strictly monotone. Hence, д(e) ∧ a0 < h(e) ∧ a0 implies that
µ
a0
i (д(e)) = µi (д(e) ∧ a0) −
∑
b ∈mb(a0)
µi (д(e) ∧ b)
< µi (h(e) ∧ a0) −
∑
b ∈mb(a0)
µi (h(e) ∧ b)
= µ
a0
i (h(e)).
Hence, for some e ∈ E and a ∈ Φ, we have
Pi (e) · µ
a
i (д(e)) · pre(e |a) < Pi (e) · µ
a
i (h(e)) · pre(e |a).
The inequality above, the definition of µ ′i (see Theorem 4.17) and the monotonicity of µ
′
i (see Theorem 4.18)
imply that µ ′i ([д]) < µ
′
i ([h]), which in turn implies that µ
E
i ([д]) < µ
E
i ([h]). 
Proof of Lemma 4.32
Lemma 4.32. For any PES-modelM and any event structure E over L,
(P+i )
EE  (P Ei )
+
.
Proof. Using Definitions 2.7 and 3.1, we get that: for any X ∈ Mini ((ME)+)↓,
(P Ei )
+(X ) =
∑
(s,e )∈X
Pi (e) · Pi (s) · pre(e | s)∑
(s ′,e ′)∼i (s,e ) Pi (e
′) · Pi (s ′) · pre(e ′ | s ′)
.
By using Definitions 3.1 and 4.28, we get that: for any [д] ∈ Mini ((M+)E)↓ ,
(P+i )
EE ([д]) =
∑
e ∈E
∑
ϕ ∈Φ Pi (e) · (P
+
i )
[[ϕ ]](д(e)) · pre(e | [[ϕ]])∑
e ∈E
∑
ϕ ∈Φ Pi (e) · (P
+
i )
[[ϕ ]](f (e)) · pre(e | [[ϕ]])
.
Let X ∈ Mini ((ME)+)↓. Following the notation introduced in the proof of Theorem 4.21, let [д] ∈ Mini ((M+)E)↓
be the map such that
д : E → P(S)
e 7→ Xe := {s ∈ S | (s, e) ∈ X }.
Notice that X is a subset of one of the i-equivalence classes of (ME)+, hence д = д ∧ pre and [д] ≤ [f ] for some
[f ] ∈ Mini ((M
+)E)↓. Let
[X ]i := {(s, e) | ∃(s
′
, e ′) ∈ X , (s, e) ∼i (s
′
, e ′)}.
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We can easily see that ([X ]i)e = f (e) where f is the canonical representative of [f ]. We have:
(P Ei )
+(X )
=
∑
(s,e )∈X
Pi (e) · Pi (s) · pre(e | s)∑
(s ′,e ′)∼i (s,e ) Pi (e
′) · Pi (s ′) · pre(e ′ | s ′)
=
∑
(s,e )∈X Pi (e) · Pi (s) · pre(e | s)∑
(s ′,e ′)∈[X ]i Pi (e
′) · Pi (s ′) · pre(e ′ | s ′)
(X is a subset of the equivalence classes [X ]i )
=
∑
e ∈E Pi (e) ·
∑
s ∈Xe Pi (s) · pre(e | s)∑
e ′∈E Pi (e
′) ·
∑
s ′∈f (e ′) Pi (s
′) · pre(e ′ | s ′)
(([X ]i)e = f (e))
=
∑
e ∈E Pi (e) ·
∑
ϕ ∈Φ pre(e | ϕ) ·
∑
s ∈д(e )∩[[ϕ ]] Pi (s)∑
e ′∈E Pi (e
′) ·
∑
ϕ ∈Φ pre(e
′ | ϕ) ·
∑
s ′∈f (e ′)∩[[ϕ ]] Pi (s
′)
(In the classical case, Φ gives a partition of SE)
=
∑
e ∈E Pi (e) ·
∑
ϕ ∈Φ pre(e | ϕ) · (P
+
i )(д(e) ∩ [[ϕ]])∑
e ′∈E Pi (e
′) ·
∑
ϕ ∈Φ pre(e
′ | ϕ) · (P+i )(f (e) ∩ [[ϕ]])
(Theorem 4.31)
=
∑
e ∈E Pi (e) ·
∑
ϕ ∈Φ pre(e | ϕ) · (P
+
i )
[[ϕ ]](д(e))∑
e ′∈E Pi (e
′) ·
∑
ϕ ∈Φ pre(e
′ | ϕ) · (P+i )
[[ϕ ]](f (e))
(Remark 15 : mb([[ϕ]]) = ∅)
=
∑
e ∈E
∑
ϕ ∈Φ Pi (e) · (P
+
i )
[[ϕ ]](д(e)) · pre(e | [[ϕ]])∑
e ∈E
∑
ϕ ∈Φ Pi (e) · (P
+
i )
[[ϕ ]](f (e)) · pre(e | [[ϕ]])
= (P+i )
EE ([д]).

B PROOF OF THE SOUNDNESS OF IPDEL
Proposition B.1 (Soundness). The axiomatization for IPDEL given in Table 2 is sound w.r.t. APE-models.
By definition, the underlying structure of an APE-structures is an epistemic Heyting algebra. Hence, it satisfies
the axioms of intuitionistic propositional logic and the axioms M1 – M7 and E for static modalities.
Axioms for inequalities.
As discussed in Remark 9, it is the case that
∨
Mini (A) = ⊤ for every epistemic Heyting algebra A. This implies
that axioms N0 and N5 are satisfied in every APE-model. Axioms N1, N2, N3, N4 and N6 are also satisfied be-
cause if the valuation of their antecedent is above any i-minimal element a then so will be the valuation of their
succedent.
Axioms for probabilities.
The fact that axioms P1-P3 are satisfied in every APE-model is shown similarly as axiom N0. Since ♦iA is a
subalgebra of A for every epistemic Heyting algebra A, it is the case that [[φ]]M ∈ ♦iA for every i-probability
formula φ and every APE-model based on A. Hence, Theorem 4.4 implies the satisfiability of P5.
Finally, let us show that P4 is satisfied in every APE-model based on A. For the right to left direction, as
discussed in Remark 9, every element of ♦iA can be written as a union of i-minimal elements and therefore
[[i (φ ↔ ψ )]] =
∨
{a ∈ Mini (A) | a ∧ [[φ]] = a ∧ [[ψ ]]}. This of course implies that
∨
{a ∈ Mini (A) | a ∧ [[φ]] =
a ∧ [[ψ ]]} ≤ [[µi (φ) = µi (ψ )]]. As for the left to right direction, we have that [[i (φ → ψ ) ∧ (µ(φ) = µ(ψ ))]] =
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{a ∈ Mini (A) | a∧[[φ]] ≤ a∧[[ψ ]] and µi (a∧[[φ]]) = µi (a∧[[ψ ]])}. By the strict monotonicity of the i-measure
µi , the following holds, as required.
[[i (φ → ψ ) ∧ (µ(φ) = µ(ψ ))]] ≤
∨
{a ∈ Mini (A) | a ∧ [[φ]] = a ∧ [[ψ ]]} = [[i (φ ↔ ψ )]].
Reduction axioms
In this section, we aim at proving the soundness of the reduction axioms as stated in Lemma B.1. To do so we
need to define two maps F and f as follows.
Preliminary results. Throughout this section, we letA denote the complex algebra of a modelM and E denote
an event structure. Recall the definition of the event structure EE (cf. Definition 5.4). Then we define a map
F : L →
∏
EE
A that associates an element in
∏
EE
A to each formula. We want F (Definition B.3) to be the map
such that
[[ψ ]]MEE = [F (ψ )].
[[ψ ]]MEE is the evaluation of the formulaψ in the updated algebraA
EE corresponding to the updated modelMEE .
Hence, F (ψ ) is a representative of the equivalence class [[ψ ]]MEE in the product algebra A
Π .
Since F (ψ ) ∈ AΠ , F (ψ ) is a tuple of elements of the algebra A. To aid the computation, we define the map
f : L × E → L (see Definition B.2) such that F (ψ )(e) = [[f (ψ , e)]]M . This means that f (ψ , e) is a formula such
that its evaluation [[f (ψ , e)]]M in the algebra A is equal to the e
th coordinate of the tuple F (ψ ). We first prove
that the maps F and f have the desired properties in Lemma B.4. Then we prove the key lemma B.5 that we will
use to prove the reduction axioms (see Section B).
Definition B.2. The map f : L × E → L is defined by recursion as follows: for everyψ ∈ L and e ∈ E,
f (p, e) = sub(e,p),
f (⊥, e) = ⊥,
f (⊤, e) = ⊤,
f (ψ1 ∧ψ2, e) = f (ψ1, e) ∧ f (ψ2, e),
f (ψ1 ∨ψ2, e) = f (ψ1, e) ∨ f (ψ2, e),
f (ψ1 → ψ2, e) = f (ψ1, e) → f (ψ2, e),
f (♦iψ , e) =
∨
e ′∼ie
♦i (f (ψ , e
′) ∧ pre(e ′)),
f (iψ , e) =
∧
e ′∼ie
i (pre(e
′) → f (ψ , e ′)),
f (〈E ′, e ′〉ψ , e) = f (pre(e ′) ∧ f (ψ , e ′), e),
f ([E ′, e ′]ψ , e) = f (pre(e ′) → f (ψ , e ′), e),
f (αµi (ψ ) ≥ β, e) = α
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
µ
ϕ
i (f (ψ , e
′)) · Pi (e
′) · pre(e ′ | ϕ) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βµ
ϕ
i (⊤)Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) ≥ 0.
Definition B.3. Let us define the map FEE : L → A
Π such that for every e ∈ E, the eth coordinate of FEE (ψ ) is
equal to [[f (ψ , e)]]M .
For the sake readability, we will omit the subscript when it causes no confusion.
Lemma B.4. ForM and E as above,
[[ψ ]]MEE = [F (ψ )]
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where F (ψ )(e) = [[f (ψ , e)]]M .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ψ with (IHψ ) : [[ψ ]]MEE = [F (ψ )]. The statement is
trivially true in the base cases and if the main connective are ∧, ∨ or→.
Ifψ = ♦iψ ′, then
[[♦iψ
′]]MEE = ♦
EE [[ψ ′]]MEE
= ♦
EE
i [F (ψ
′)] (IHψ ′)
= [♦
∏
i (F (ψ
′) ∧ preM)]
and
♦
∏
i (F (ψ
′) ∧ preM)(e) =
∨
e ′∼ie
{♦i (F (ψ
′)(e ′) ∧ pre(e ′))} (Theorem 4.12)
=
∨
e ′∼ie
{♦i ([[f (ψ
′
, e ′)]]M ∧ pre(e
′))}
= [[
∨
e ′∼ie
♦i (f (ψ
′
, e ′) ∧ pre(e ′))]]M
= [[f (♦iψ
′
, e)]]M (Definition B.2)
= F (♦iψ
′)(e)
Ifψ = iψ ′, then
[[iψ
′]]MEE = 
EE
i [[ψ
′]]MEE
= 
EE
i [F (ψ
′)] (IHψ ′)
= [
∏
i (preM → F (ψ
′))]
and

∏
i (preM → F (ψ
′))(e) =
∧
e ′∼ie
{i (pre(e
′) → F (ψ ′)(e ′))} (Theorem 4.12)
=
∧
e ′∼ie
{i (pre(e
′) → [[f (ψ ′, e ′)]]M)}
= [[
∧
e ′∼ie
i (pre(e
′) → f (ψ ′, e ′))]]M
= [[f (iψ
′
, e)]]M (Definition B.2)
= F (iψ
′)(e).
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Ifψ = αµi (ψ ′) ≥ β , then
[[αµi (ψ
′) ≥ β]]MEE
=
∨{
[fe,a]
 αµEEi ([[ψ ′]]MEE ∧ [fe,a]) ≥ β}
=
∨{
[fe,a]
 αµEEi ([F (ψ ′)] ∧ [fe,a]) ≥ β} (IHψ ′)
=
∨{
[fe,a]
 α µ ′i (F (ψ ′) ∧ fe,a)µ ′i (fe,a) ≥ β
}
(Theorem 4.28)
=
[∨ {
fe,a
 α µ ′i (F (ψ ′) ∧ fe,a)µ ′i (fe,a) ≥ β
}]
=
[∨ {
fe,a
 αµ ′i (F (ψ ′) ∧ fe,a) − βµ ′i (fe,a) ≥ 0}]
=

∨ fe,a
 α
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
µ
ϕ
i (F (ψ
′)(e ′) ∧ a) · Pi (e
′) · pre(e ′ | ϕ) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βµ
ϕ
i (a) · Pi (e
′) · pre(e ′ | ϕ) ≥ 0


and
©­­­«
∨ fe,a
 α
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
µ
ϕ
i (F (ψ
′)(e ′) ∧ a)Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βµ
ϕ
i (a)Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) ≥ 0

ª®®®¬ (d)
=
©­­­«
∨ fe,a
 α
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
µ
ϕ
i ([[f (ψ
′
, e ′)]]M ∧ a)Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βµ
ϕ
i (a)Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) ≥ 0

ª®®®¬ (d)
=
∨a
 α
∑
e ′∼id
ϕ ∈Φ
µ
ϕ
i ([[f (ψ
′
, e ′)]]M ∧ a)Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) +
∑
e ′∼id
ϕ ∈Φ
−βµ
ϕ
i (a)Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) ≥ 0

= [[α
∑
e ′∼id
ϕ ∈Φ
µ
ϕ
i (f (ψ
′
, e ′))Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) +
∑
e ′∼id
ϕ ∈Φ
−βµ
ϕ
i (⊤)Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) ≥ 0]]M
= [[f (αµi (ψ
′) ≥ β,d)]]M (Definition B.2)
= F (αµi (ψ
′) ≥ β)(d).
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Ifψ = 〈E ′, e ′〉ψ ′ andN =MEE , then
[[〈E ′, e ′〉ψ ′]]N = [[pre(e
′)]]N ∧ πe ′ ◦ i
′([[ψ ′]]NEE′ )
= [[pre(e ′)]]N ∧ πe ′ ◦ i
′([F (ψ ′)]) (IHψ ′)
= [[pre(e ′)]]N ∧ πe ′(F (ψ
′) ∧ pre)
= [[pre(e ′)]]N ∧ F (ψ
′)(e ′) ∧ [[pre(e ′)]]N
= [[pre(e ′)]]N ∧ [[f (ψ
′
, e ′)]]N ∧ [[pre(e
′)]]N
= [[pre(e ′)]]N ∧ [[f (ψ
′
, e ′)]]N
= [[pre(e ′) ∧ f (ψ ′, e ′)]]N
= [F (pre(e ′) ∧ f (ψ ′, e ′))] (IHpre (e ′)∧f (ψ ′,e ′)N )
and
F (pre(e ′) ∧ f (ψ ′, e ′))(e) = [[f (pre(e ′) ∧ f (ψ ′, e ′), e)]]M
= [[f (〈E ′, e ′〉ψ ′, e)]]M (Definition B.2)
= F (〈E ′, e ′〉ψ ′)(e).
Finally, ifψ = [E ′, e ′]ψ ′ and N =MEE , then
[[[E ′, e ′]ψ ′]]N = [[pre(e
′)]]N → πe ′ ◦ i
′([[ψ ′]]NEE′ )
= [[pre(e ′)]]N → πe ′ ◦ i
′([F (ψ ′)]) (IHψ ′)
= [[pre(e ′)]]N → πe ′(F (ψ
′) ∧ pre)
= [[pre(e ′)]]N → F (ψ
′)(e ′) ∧ [[pre(e ′)]]N
= [[pre(e ′)]]N → [[f (ψ
′
, e ′)]]N ∧ [[pre(e
′)]]N
= [[pre(e ′)]]N → [[f (ψ
′
, e ′)]]N (a → (a ∧ b) = a → b)
= [[pre(e ′) → f (ψ ′, e ′)]]N
= [F (pre(e ′) → f (ψ ′, e ′))] (IHpre (e ′)→f (ψ ′,e ′))
and
F (pre(e ′) → f (ψ ′, e ′))(e) = [[f (pre(e ′) → f (ψ ′, e ′), e)]]M
= [[f ([E ′, e ′]ψ ′, e)]]M (Definition B.2)
= F ([E ′, e ′]ψ ′)(e).

Lemma B.5. For everyM, E, e andψ ,
[[〈E, e〉ψ ]]M = preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ , e)]]M and [[[E, e]ψ ]]M = preM(e) → [[f (ψ , e)]]M .
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Proof. We have
[[〈E, e〉ψ ]]M = [[pre(e)]]M ∧ πe ◦ i
′([[ψ ]]MEE )
= preM(e) ∧ πe ◦ i
′([F (ψ )]) (Lemma B.4)
= preM(e) ∧ πe (F (ψ ) ∧ preM)
= preM(e) ∧ F (ψ )(e) ∧ preM(e)
= preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ , e)]]M
and
[[[E, e]ψ ]]M = [[pre(e)]]M → πe ◦ i
′([[ψ ]]MEE )
= preM(e) → πe ◦ i
′([F (ψ )]) (Lemma B.4)
= preM(e) → πe (F (ψ ) ∧ preM)
= preM(e) → F (ψ )(e) ∧ preM(e)
= preM(e) → [[f (ψ , e)]]M ∧ preM(e)
= preM(e) → [[f (ψ , e)]]M . (a → (a ∧ b) = a → b)

Proof of the soundness of the reduction axioms.
Axiom I1. [E, e]p = pre(e) → sub(e,p).
[[[E, e]p]]M = preM(e) → [[f (p, e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) → [[sub(e,p)]]M .
Axiom I2. 〈E, e〉p = pre(e) ∧ sub(e,p).
[[〈E, e〉p]]M = preM(e) ∧ [[f (p, e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) ∧ [[sub(e,p)]]M .
Axiom I3. [E, e]⊤ = ⊤.
[[[E, e]⊤]]M = preM(e) → [[f (⊤, e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) → [[⊤]]M
= [[⊤]]M .
Axiom I4. 〈E, e〉⊤ = pre(e).
[[〈E, e〉⊤]]M = preM(e) ∧ [[f (⊤, e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) ∧ [[⊤]]M
= preM(e).
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Axiom I5. [E, e]⊥ = ¬pre(e).
[[[E, e]⊥]]M = preM(e) → [[f (⊥, e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) → [[⊥]]M
= [[¬pre(e)]]M.
Axiom I6. 〈E, e〉⊥ = ⊥.
[[〈E, e〉⊥]]M = preM(e) ∧ [[f (⊥, e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) ∧ [[⊥]]M
= ⊥.
Axiom I7. [E, e] (ψ1 ∧ψ2) = [E, e]ψ1 ∧ [E, e]ψ2.
[[[E, e] (ψ1 ∧ψ2)]]M = preM(e) → [[f (ψ1 ∧ψ2, e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) → [[f (ψ1, e) ∧ f (ψ2, e)]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM(e) → [[f (ψ1, e)]]M ∧ [[f (ψ2, e)]]M
= (preM(e) → [[f (ψ1, e)]]M) ∧ (preM(e) → [[f (ψ2, e)]]M)
(a → b ∧ c = (a → b) ∧ (a → c))
= [[[E, e]ψ1]]M ∧ [[[E, e]ψ2]]M (Lemma B.5)
Axiom I8. 〈E, e〉(ψ1 ∧ψ2) = 〈E, e〉ψ1 ∧ 〈E, e〉ψ2 .
[[〈E, e〉(ψ1 ∧ψ2)]]M = preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1 ∧ψ2, e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e) ∧ f (ψ2, e)]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e)]]M ∧ preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ2, e)]]M
= [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M ∧ [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M (Lemma B.5)
Axiom I9. [E, e] (ψ1 ∨ψ2) = pre(e) → 〈E, e〉ψ1 ∨ 〈E, e〉ψ2 .
[[[E, e] (ψ1 ∨ψ2)]]M = preM(e) → [[f (ψ1 ∨ψ2, e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) → [[f (ψ1, e) ∨ f (ψ2, e)]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM(e) → preM(e) ∧ ([[f (ψ1, e)]]M ∨ [[f (ψ2, e)]]M) (a → b = a → a ∧ b)
= preM(e) → (preM ∧ [[f (ψ1, e)]]M) ∨ (preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ2, e)]]M) (distributivity)
= preM(e) → [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M ∨ [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M (Lemma B.5)
Axiom I10. 〈E, e〉(ψ1 ∨ψ2) = 〈E, e〉ψ1 ∨ 〈E, e〉ψ2.
[[〈E, e〉(ψ1 ∨ψ2)]]M = preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1 ∨ψ2, e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e) ∨ f (ψ2, e)]]M (Definition B.2)
= (preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e)]]M) ∨ (preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ2, e)]]M) (distributivity)
= [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M ∨ [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M (Lemma B.5)
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Axiom I11. [E, e] (ψ1 → ψ2) = 〈E, e〉ψ1 → 〈E, e〉ψ2.
[[[E, e] (ψ1 → ψ2)]]M = preM(e) → [[f (ψ1 → ψ2, e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) → [[f (ψ1, e) → f (ψ2, e)]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM(e) → ([[f (ψ1, e)]]M → [[f (ψ2, e)]]M)
= preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e)]]M → [[f (ψ2, e)]]M (a → (b → c) = a ∧ b → c)
= preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e)]]M → preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e)]]M ∧ [[f (ψ2, e)]]M
(b → c = b → b ∧ c))
= [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M → [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M ∧ [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M (Lemma B.5)
= [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M → [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M . (b → c = b → b ∧ c))
Axiom I12. 〈E, e〉(ψ1 → ψ2) = pre(e) ∧ (〈E, e〉ψ1 → 〈E, e〉ψ2).
[[〈E, e〉(ψ1 → ψ2)]]M = preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1 → ψ2, e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e) → f (ψ2, e)]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM(e) ∧ ([[f (ψ1, e)]]M → [[f (ψ2, e)]]M)
= preM(e) ∧ (preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e)]]M → [[f (ψ2, e)]]M) (a ∧ (b → c) = a ∧ (a ∧ b → c))
= preM(e) ∧ (preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e)]]M → [[f (ψ2, e)]]M ∧ preM(e) ∧ [[f (ψ1, e)]]M)
(b → c = b → b ∧ c))
= preM(e) ∧ ([[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M → [[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M ∧ [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M) (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) ∧ ([[〈E, e〉ψ1]]M → [[〈E, e〉ψ2]]M). (b → c = b → b ∧ c))
Axiom I13 [E, e]♦iψ = pre(e) →
∨
e ′∼ie ♦i (〈E, e
′〉ψ ).
[[[E, e]♦iψ ]]M = preM(e) → [[f (♦iψ , e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) → [[
∨
e ′∼ie
♦i (f (ψ , e
′) ∧ pre(e ′))]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM(e) →
∨
e ′∼ie
♦i ([[f (ψ , e
′)]]M ∧ preM(e
′))
= preM(e) →
∨
e ′∼ie
♦i ([[〈E, e
′〉ψ ]]M ) (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) → [[
∨
e ′∼ie
♦i (〈E, e
′〉ψ )]]M .
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Axiom I14. 〈E, e〉♦iψ = pre(e) ∧
∨
e ′∼ie ♦i (〈E, e
′〉ψ ).
[[〈E, e〉♦iψ ]]M = preM(e) ∧ [[f (♦iψ , e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) ∧ [[
∨
e ′∼ie
♦i (f (ψ , e
′) ∧ pre(e ′))]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM(e) ∧
∨
e ′∼ie
♦i ([[f (ψ , e
′)]]M ∧ preM(e
′))
= preM(e) ∧
∨
e ′∼ie
♦i ([[〈E, e
′〉ψ ]]M ) (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) ∧ [[
∨
e ′∼ie
♦i (〈E, e
′〉ψ )]]M .
Axiom I15. [E, e]iψ = pre(e) →
∧
e ′∼ie i ([E, e
′]ψ ).
[[[E, e]iψ ]]M = preM(e) → [[f (iψ , e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) → [[
∧
e ′∼ie
i (pre(e
′) → f (ψ , e ′))]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM(e) →
∧
e ′∼ie
i (preM(e
′) → [[f (ψ , e ′)]]M)
= preM(e) →
∧
e ′∼ie
i ([[[E, e
′]ψ ]]M) (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) → [[
∧
e ′∼ie
i ([E, e
′]ψ )]]M .
Axiom I16. 〈E, e〉iψ = pre(e) ∧
∧
e ′∼ie i ([E, e
′]ψ ).
[[〈E, e〉iψ ]]M = preM(e) ∧ [[f (iψ , e)]]M (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) ∧ [[
∧
e ′∼ie
i (pre(e
′) → f (ψ , e ′))]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM(e) ∧
∧
e ′∼ie
i (preM(e
′) → [[f (ψ , e ′)]]M)
= preM(e) ∧
∧
e ′∼ie
i ([[[E, e
′]ψ ]]M) (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) ∧ [[
∧
e ′∼ie
i ([E, e
′]ψ )]]M .
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Axiom I17. [E, e] (αµi (ψ ) ≥ β) = pre(e) →
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i ([E, e
′]ψ ) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (⊤) ≥ 0
[[[E, e] (αµi (ψ ) ≥ β)]]M = preM(e) → [[f (αµi (ψ ) ≥ β, e)]]M
= preM(e) → [[α
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
µ
ϕ
i (f (ψ , e
′))Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) − β
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
µ
ϕ
i (⊤)Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) ≥ 0]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM(e) →
∨a

∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i ([[f (ψ , e
′)]]M ∧ a) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (a) ≥ 0

= preM(e) →
∨a

∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i ([[f (ψ , e
′)]]M ∧ preM(e
′) ∧ a) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (a) ≥ 0

( [[φ]]M ≤ preM(e
′) if pre(e ′ | φ) , 0, cf. Proposition 4.16)
= preM(e) →
∨a

∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i ((preM(e
′) → [[f (ψ , e ′)]]M) ∧ preM(e
′) ∧ a) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (a) ≥ 0

( a ∧ (a → b) = a ∧ b)
= preM(e) →
∨a

∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i ([[[E, e
′]ψ ]]M ∧ preM(e
′) ∧ a) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (a) ≥ 0
 (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) →
∨a
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αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i ([[[E, e
′]ψ ]]M ∧ a) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (a) ≥ 0

( [[φ]]M ≤ preM(e
′) if pre(e ′ | φ) , 0)
= preM(e) → [[
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i ([E, e
′]ψ ) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (⊤) ≥ 0]]M
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Axiom I18. 〈E, e〉(αµi (ψ ) ≥ β) = pre(e) ∧
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (〈E, e
′〉ψ ) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (⊤) ≥ 0
[[〈E, e〉(αµi (ψ ) ≥ β)]]M
= preM(e) ∧ [[f (αµi (ψ ) ≥ β, e)]]M
= preM(e) ∧ [[α
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
µ
ϕ
i (f (ψ , e
′))Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) − β
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
µ
ϕ
i (⊤)Pi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ) ≥ 0]]M (Definition B.2)
= preM(e) ∧
∨a

∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i ([[f (ψ , e
′)]]M ∧ a) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (a) ≥ 0

= preM(e) ∧
∨a

∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i ([[f (ψ , e
′)]]M ∧ preM(e
′) ∧ a) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (a) ≥ 0

( [[φ]]M ≤ preM(e
′) if pre(e ′ | φ) , 0, cf. Proposition 4.16)
= preM(e) ∧
∨a

∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i ([[〈E, e
′〉ψ ]]M ∧ a) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (a) ≥ 0
 (Lemma B.5)
= preM(e) ∧ [[
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
αPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (〈E, e
′〉ψ ) +
∑
e ′∼ie
ϕ ∈Φ
−βPi (e
′)pre(e ′ | ϕ)µ
ϕ
i (⊤) ≥ 0]]M
A
C
M
T
ran
saction
s
on
C
om
pu
tation
al
L
ogic,V
ol.0,N
o.
0,A
rticle
.P
u
blication
date:
A
pril
2018.
Probabilistic Epistemic Updates on Algebras • :67
C PROOF OF THE COMPLETENESS OF IPDEL
In the present section, we prove the weak completeness of IPDEL w.r.t. APE-models. Recall that a calculus is
weakly complete w.r.t. a semantics if it provides a proof for every validity, namely, for any formula ϕ, if |= ϕ
then ⊢ ϕ. Similarly to akin logical systems (cf. [BMS99, KP13, MPS14, vBvEK06] [CRR16, BR15b, Ach14]), the
proof relies on a reduction procedure of IPDEL-formulas to formulas of the static fragment of IPDEL (referred to
in what follows as IPEL), which preserves provable equivalence. This reduction procedure is effected using the
interaction axioms and the rule of substitution of equivalent formulas. We omit the details since this procedure
is standard (see for instance [BM04, BMS99, WC13] for details). In the reminder of the present section, we prove
the weak completeness of IPEL w.r.t. APE-models, i.e., we show that every APE-validity in the language of IPEL
is a theorem of IPEL. By contraposition, this is equivalent to proving that for any IPEL-formula φ which is not
an IPEL-theorem, there exists an APE-modelM that does not satisfy φ in the sense that [[φ]]M , ⊤.
The proof will proceed as follows. In section C, we extract a finite sublattice of the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
of the logic that contains φ and we prove that it is an Epistemic Heyting Algebra satisfying certain properties
akin to those described in [FS+78]. Then, in section C, following ideas from [FHM90] adapted to the algebraic
setting, we define appropriate i-measures over the finite Epistemic Heyting Algebra to turn it into an APE-model
that does not satisfy φ.
The epistemic Heyting algebra A⋆φ
In this subsection, we construct the finite epistemic Heyting algebra on which the counter-model for φ is based.
The construction consists of a number of steps, starting with the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra ofL and restricting
it accordingly.
Henceforth, we let
A =
(
A,⊤A,⊥A,∨A,∧A,→A, (♦i )i ∈Ag, (i )i ∈Ag
)
(C.1)
denote the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of IPEL. We will use ¬A(•) as shorthand for • →A ⊥A. For any agent i ,
we define:
♦iA := {♦ia ∈ A | a ∈ A}.
For any formula σ ∈ LI PEL , we let σA ∈ A denote the equivalence class of σ modulo provable equivalence in
IPEL. Let
B := (B,⊤B,⊥B,∨B,∧B,¬B)
be the Boolean Extension of the Heyting algebra reduct of A (see [Mac37, Section 13, page 450]).9 To enhance
readability, we identify A with its image through the embedding A ֒→ B. Recall that A is a sublattice of B.
Henceforth, we will use ∨ and ∧ and ⊤ and ⊥ ambiguously to denote the operations on both algebras. Since
♦iA is a Boolean algebra (see Theorem 4.4) and, in every Boolean algebra, negation is unique, we have that
¬Aa = ¬Ba for every a ∈ ♦iA and for every agent i ∈ Ag.
Let φ be an IPEL-formula that is not a theorem. Let
Sφ := {σ
A | σ is a subformula of φ},
let Agφ be the set of agents that appear in φ and let S
♦
φ ⊇ Sφ be
S♦φ := Sφ ∪ {(♦iσ )
A
, (¬♦iσ )
A | σ ∈ Sφ and i ∈ Agφ }.
Notice that the sets Sφ and S
♦
φ are finite. Now, let Bφ ⊆ B be the Boolean subalgebra of B generated by S
♦
φ . Since
S♦φ is finite, so will be the domain of Bφ (which we denote with Bφ ). In addition, since Bφ is a sub-lattice of the
9The Boolean extension of A can be identified with the algebra of clopens of the Esakia space dual to A. Notice that this is exactly the same
construction semantically underlying the Gödel-Tarski translation (cf. [CPZ, Section 3] for an expanded discussion).
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non-trivial boolean algebra B, it contains at least two elements and has at least one atom. Plus, it follows that
Bφ is generated by its atoms. In view of what will follow, let us endow Bφ with a measure µB as follows. Let
n ≥ 1 be the number of atoms of Bφ . For every a ∈ Bφ that is above exactlym atoms, let
µB(a) =
m
n
. (C.2)
Now, let
Aφ :=
(
Aφ ,⊤,⊥,∧,∨
)
with Aφ := A ∩ Bφ . Notice that, since both A and Bφ are distributive lattices, so is Aφ . For every agent i ∈ Agφ ,
we define
A♦iφ := {a ∈ Aφ | there exists σ ∈ L such that ♦iσ ∈ a} = Aφ ∩ ♦iA.
Notice that, if a ∈ A♦iφ , then ¬Aa ∈ A
♦i
φ as well (since ¬Ba ∈ Bφ and ¬Ba = ¬Aa). Hence, for every agent i ∈ Agφ ,(
A♦iφ ,⊤,⊥,∧,∨,¬A
)
is a Boolean subalgebra of Aφ . We are now ready to endow Aφ with an epistemic Heyting
algebra structure.
Definition C.1. Let
A
⋆
φ :=
(
Aφ ,→
⋆
, (♦⋆i )i ∈Ag, (
⋆
i )i ∈Ag
)
where, for all a,b ∈ Aφ ,
a →⋆ b :=
∨
{c ∈ Aφ | c ≤ a →A b} =
∨
{c ∈ Aφ | c ∧ a ≤ b},
for all i ∈ Agφ and a ∈ Aφ ,
♦⋆i a :=
∧
{b ∈ A♦iφ | a ≤ b} and 
⋆
i a :=
∨
{b ∈ A♦iφ | b ≤ a},
for all i < Agφ and a ∈ Aφ ,
♦⋆i a :=
{
⊤ if a , ⊥,
⊥ if a = ⊥,
and ⋆i a :=
{
⊥ if a , ⊤,
⊤ if a = ⊤.
The operations above are well-defined sinceAφ is a finite distributive lattice and hence all the joins and meets
exist.
Lemma C.2. For every i ∈ Agφ , the algebra A
⋆
φ satisfies the following properties:
(1) ♦⋆i A
⋆
φ = {♦
⋆
i a | a ∈ A
⋆
φ } ⊆ A
♦i
φ ;
(2) ♦⋆i A
⋆
φ = 
⋆
i A
⋆
φ ;
(3) for all a ∈ A♦iφ , it holds that ♦
⋆
i a = a and 
⋆
i a = a;
(4) for all a,b ∈ A⋆φ , if a →A b ∈ A
⋆
φ , then a →
⋆ b = a →A b;
(5) for all a ∈ A⋆φ , if ♦ia ∈ A
⋆
φ (resp. ia ∈ A
⋆
φ ), then ♦
⋆
i a = ♦ia (resp. 
⋆
i a = ia);
(6) for all formulas ψ ,φ ∈ L, if (♦iψ )
A ∈ S♦φ (resp. (iψ )
A ∈ S♦φ or (ψ → χ)
A ∈ S♦φ ), then ♦
⋆
i ψ
A
= ♦iψ
A (resp.

⋆
i ψ
A
= iψ
A orψA →⋆ χA = ψA →A χ
A).
(7) ♦⋆i A
⋆
φ = {♦
⋆
i a | a ∈ A
⋆
φ } = A
♦i
φ ;
Proof. The first five items follow immediately from the definition of ♦⋆i and 
⋆
i . Item 6 is an application of
items 4 and 5. Item 7 follows from items 1 and 3. 
Lemma C.3. The algebra A⋆φ is an epistemic Heyting algebra.
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Proof. As mentioned early on,Aφ is a distributive lattice. Moreover, by definition,→⋆ is the right residual of
∧ in Aφ . This shows that A⋆φ is a Heyting algebra. To prove that A
⋆
φ is an epistemic Heyting algebra, it remains
to show that A⋆φ satisfies the following axioms (c.f. Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.3):
a ≤ ♦ia (M1)
ia ≤ a (M2)
♦i (a ∨ b) ≤ ♦ia ∨ ♦ib (M3)
i (a → b) ≤ ia → ib (M4)
♦ia ≤ i♦ia (M5)
♦iia ≤ ia (M6)
i (a → b) ≤ ♦ia → ♦ib (M7)
♦i⊥ ≤ ⊥ (M8)
⊤ ≤ i⊤ (M9)
♦ia ∨ ¬♦ia = ⊤. (E)
Let i ∈ Agφ . By definition, it immediately follows that ♦
⋆
i and 
⋆
i verify axioms M1 and M2. Axiom M3 holds
because ♦⋆i a ∨ ♦
⋆
i b ∈ ♦iAφ and a ∨ b ≤ ♦
⋆
i a ∨ ♦
⋆
i b (and similarly for axiom M4).
As for axioms M5 and M6, since ♦⋆i a,
⋆
i a ∈ ♦iAφ , by item 3 of Lemma C.2, we obtain that ♦
⋆
i 
⋆
i a = 
⋆
i a
and ♦⋆i a = 
⋆
i ♦
⋆
i a, which imply the axioms.
In the context of axioms M1 through M6, axiom M7 is equivalent to ♦i (♦ip → ♦iq) → (♦ip → ♦iq) (see
[Bez98, Lemma 2]), so let us show that A⋆φ satisfies ♦i (♦ip → ♦iq) → (♦ip → ♦iq). Observe that for all
a,b ∈ A⋆φ , since ♦
⋆
i a,♦
⋆
i b ∈ A
♦i
φ and A
♦i
φ is a Boolean algebra (and hence contains ¬A♦
⋆
i a), we have that
♦⋆i a →A ♦
⋆
i b = ¬A♦
⋆
i a ∨ ♦
⋆
i b ∈ A
♦i
φ
which implies by item 4 of Lemma C.2 that
♦⋆i a →
⋆ ♦⋆i b = ♦
⋆
i a →A ♦
⋆
i b . (C.3)
Now, by item 3 of Lemma C.2, we have that
♦⋆i (♦
⋆
i a →A ♦
⋆
i b) = ♦
⋆
i a →A ♦
⋆
i b
which by the equation (C.3) is equivalent to
♦⋆i (♦
⋆
i a →
⋆ ♦⋆i b) = ♦
⋆
i a →
⋆ ♦⋆i b,
that is, A⋆φ satisfies ♦i (♦ip → ♦iq) → (♦ip → ♦iq).
Axioms M8 and M9 follow from the fact that ⊤,⊥ ∈ Aφ ∩ ♦iA and item 3 of Lemma C.2.
Finally, axiom E follows immediately from item 4 of LemmaC.2 and from the fact thatA♦iφ is a Boolean algebra.
Hence if a ∈ A♦iφ then (a →A ⊥A) ∈ A
♦i
φ . 
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Measures on A⋆φ
In this section, for each agent i ∈ Agφ , we will define an i-measure on the algebra A
⋆
φ and a valuation on A
⋆
φ ,
so as to define an APE-model Mφ such that [[σ ]]Mφ = σ
A for every subformula σ of φ. Before defining the
measures, we will state some auxiliary results.
Lemma C.4. The system IPEL proves all classical truths about linear inequalities.
Proof. See [FHM90] for an explanation of why axioms N0 to N6 are enough. Notice that, even though the
result is proven for classical logic, it still holds for IPEL. Indeed, the fragment of the logic involving inequalities
is classical because of the axiom N5: (τ ≥ β) ∨ (¬τ ≥ β). 
Lemma C.5. The formulas(
♦iψ ∧
(∑
m
αmµi (ϕm) ≥ β
))
→
(∑
m
αmµi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) ≥ β
)
(C.4)
and (
♦iψ ∧
(∑
m
αmµi (ϕm) < β
))
→
(∑
m
αmµi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) < β
)
(C.5)
are provable in IPEL.
Proof. We only prove (C.4), the proof of (C.5) being almost verbatim. Early on we observed (see Lemma 5.8)
that axiom P4 implies the validity of iφ ↔ (µi (φ) = 1). This and axiom M5 (i.e. ♦iψ ↔ i♦iψ ) imply
⊢IPEL ♦iψ ↔ (µi (♦iψ ) = 1). (C.6)
Since ⊢IPEL ♦iψ → (♦iψ ∨ ϕm) for every ϕm ∈ L, by rule Subµ we obtain
⊢IPEL µi (♦iψ ) ≤ µi (♦iψ ∨ ϕm). (C.7)
From (C.7) and Lemma C.4, we deduce that
⊢IPEL µi (♦iψ ) = 1→ µi (ϕm ∨ ♦iψ ) = 1. (C.8)
Lemma C.4 and axiom P3 (i.e. µi (ϕm) = µi (ϕm ∨ ♦iψ ) + µi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) − µi (♦iψ )) entail
⊢IPEL
(∑
m
αmµi (ϕm) ≥ β
)
↔
(∑
m
αm
(
µi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) + µi (ϕm ∨ ♦iψ ) − µi (♦iψ )
)
≥ β
)
. (C.9)
Combining (C.6), (C.8) and (C.9), we obtain
⊢IPEL
(
♦iψ ∧A
)
→
( (
µi (♦iψ ) = 1
)
∧
∧
m
(
µi (ϕm ∨ ♦iψ ) = 1
)
∧ B
)
(C.10)
with
A :=
∑
m
αmµi (ϕm) ≥ β,
and
B :=
∑
m
αm(µi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) + µi (ϕm ∨ ♦iψ ) − µi (♦iψ )) ≥ β .
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Again, by using Lemma C.4, we obtain that
⊢IPEL
(
(µi (♦iψ ) = 1) ∧
∧
m
(µi (ϕm ∨ ♦iψ ) = 1) ∧ B
)
→ D (C.11)
with
D :=
∑
m
αmµi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) ≥ β .
Putting (C.10) and (C.11) together, we finally get:
⊢IPEL
(
♦iψ ∧
∑
m
αmµi (ϕm) ≥ β
)
→
(∑
m
αmµi (ϕm ∧ ♦iψ ) ≥ β
)
as desired. 
Observe that for any agent i ∈ Agφ , since A
⋆
φ is finite and ♦
⋆
i A
⋆
φ = A
♦i
φ is a Boolean algebra, it is the case that
the i-minimal elements are the atoms of this Boolean algebra and every element of A♦iφ can be written as the
union of some of these i-minimal elements. Let ni be the number of i-minimal elements of A⋆φ . Let us call a
i
k
, for
1 ≤ k ≤ ni , the i-minimal elements of A⋆φ . Now, for each i-probability formula σ with σ
A ∈ S♦φ , we have that
σA ∈ A
♦i
φ . Hence, we have that (¬σ )
A ∈ A
♦i
φ . This implies that there exists a function fσ : {1, 2, . . . ,ni } → {0, 1}
such that
σA =
∨
fσ (k)=1
aik and (¬σ )
A
=
∨
fσ (k)=0
aik .
It should be stressed that since ∨ and ∧ in A⋆φ are inherited by A, these equalities hold in A as well.
Now, let us fix i ∈ Agφ . For every k ∈ ni , we define a system of equations Eai
k
, with variables xb for every
b ≤ ai
k
as follows10:
Eai
k
:=
©­­­­­­­­­­­­«
∑
αm · x
i
ψAm∧a
i
k
≥ β, for all σ := (
∑
αm · µi (ψm) ≥ β) with σA ∈ S
♦
φ and fσ (k) = 1∑
αm · x
i
ψAm∧a
i
k
< β, for all σ := (
∑
αm · µi (ψm) ≥ β) with σA ∈ S
♦
φ and fσ (k) = 0
x i
b
≥ 0 and xb ≤ 1, for all b ∈ A⋆φ with b ≤ a
i
k
x i
b
+ x ic = x
i
b∧c
+ x i
b∨c
, for all b, c ∈ A⋆φ with b, c ≤ a
i
k
x i
b
≤ x ic , for all b, c ∈ A
⋆
φ with b ≤ c ≤ a
i
k
x i⊥ = 0
x i
ai
k
= 1
ª®®®®®®®®®®®®¬
.
For a solution s of the above system, we denote with (x i
b
)s the solution according to s of x i
b
.
Notice that the system is designed in such a way that any particular solution (cf. Lemma C.8) provides an i-
measure on A⋆φ that guarantees that the valuation of an i-probability formula σ is σ
A. Indeed, the first two types
of inequalities in the system will guarantee that exactly the i-minimal elements of A⋆φ below σ
A will constitute
[[σ ]] (see Definition 5.6). The rest of the inequalities will guarantee that the solution satisfies the basic properties
of i-measures.
Observe that, for every b ≤ ai
k
, there exists a formula τb such that b = τAb and if b ≤ c then ⊢IPEL τb → τc .
Let Eτ
ai
k
be the system of equations where each x i
b
is replaced by µi (τb ). Since aik is i-minimal, we can assume
10The sums in system of equations Eai
k
range overm.
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without loss of generality that τai
k
is of the form ♦iτ ′. Furthermore, let PSi ⊆ S
♦
φ be the set of i-probability
formulas that are subformulas of φ. For every σA ∈ PSi such that σ := (
∑
αm · µi (ψm) ≥ β), let σ [aik ] be the
formula
∑
αm · µi (ψm ∧ τai
k
) ≥ β .
Lemma C.6. For every k ∈ ni , the system Eai
k
has a solution.
Proof. Notice that all but the first two types of inequalities in Eτ
ai
k
are provable in IPEL as they are immediate
consequences of axioms P1, P2, P3 and the rule Subµ . Heading towards a contradiction, let us first assume that Eai
k
does not have a solution at all. This is a truth about linear inequalities of rational numbers, hence, by Lemma C.4,
it is provable in IPDEL. As mentioned above, since some inequalities are provable this is tantamount to saying
that
⊢IPEL ¬
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=1
σ [aik ]
ª®®®®¬
∧
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=0
¬σ [aik ]
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
. (C.12)
Notice that, by Lemma C.5, we have: for every σA ∈ PSi ,
⊢IPEL
(
σ ∧ τai
k
)
→ σ [aik ]
and
⊢IPEL
(
¬σ ∧ τai
k
)
→ ¬σ [aik ].
Therefore,
⊢IPEL
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=1
σ
ª®®®®¬
∧
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=0
¬σ
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
∧ τai
k
ª®®®®¬
→
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=1
σ [aik ]
ª®®®®¬
∧
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=0
¬σ [aik ]
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
. (C.13)
Since one direction of contraposition is provable in intiontionistic logic we obtain that:
⊢IPEL
©­­­­«
¬
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=1
σ [aik ]
ª®®®®¬
∧
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=0
¬σ [aik ]
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
→ ¬
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=1
σ
ª®®®®¬
∧
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=0
¬σ
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
∧ τai
k
ª®®®®¬
. (C.14)
(C.12) and (C.14) imply that
⊢IPEL ¬
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=1
σ
ª®®®®¬
∧
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=0
¬σ
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
∧ τai
k
ª®®®®¬
. (C.15)
In addition, A⋆φ inherits the order from A and by construction a
i
k
≤ σA when fσ (k) = 1 and aik ≤ (¬σ )
A
when fσ (k) = 0. Hence, we have that, for all σ ∈ PSi , if fσ (k) = 1 then ⊢IPEL τai
k
→ σ and if fσ (k) = 0 then
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⊢IPEL τai
k
→ ¬σ . Therefore, we have
⊢IPEL τai
k
→
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=1
σ
ª®®®®¬
∧
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=0
¬σ
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
.
Hence,
⊢IPEL ¬τai
k
↔ ¬
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=1
σ
ª®®®®¬
∧
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=0
¬σ
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
∧ τai
k
ª®®®®¬
and by (C.15)
⊢IPEL ¬τai
k
.
We have reached a contradiction because ai
k
is an element of A different from ⊥ and hence each formula corre-
sponding to it is consistent. Therefore Eai
k
has a solution. 
LemmaC.7. For every k ∈ ni and every b < c ≤ a
i
k
, the system Eai
k
has a solution sb,c such that (x
i
b
)sb,c < (x ic )
sb,c .
Proof. Heading towards a contradiction, let b < c ≤ ai
k
such that, for every solution s of Eai
k
, we have
(x i
b
)s = (x ic )
s . This is a fact of inequalities of real numbers and therefore, by Lemma C.4, it is provable in IPEL.
Since all but the first two types of inequalities in Eai
k
are provable in IPEL, we have that
⊢IPEL
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=1
σ [aik ]
ª®®®®¬
∧
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=0
¬σ [aik ]
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
→ µi (τb ) = µi (τc ).
Since ⊢IPEL τb → τc , necessitation implies ⊢IPEL i (τb → τc ). Using axiom P4( (
i (ϕ → ψ )
)
∧
(
µi (ϕ) = µi (ψ )
) )
↔ i (ψ ↔ ϕ),
we obtain that
⊢IPEL
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=1
σ [aik ]
ª®®®®¬
∧
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=0
¬σ [aik ]
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
→ i (τc → τb ). (C.16)
Recall that11
⊢IPEL τai
k
→
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=1
σ
ª®®®®¬
∧
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=0
¬σ
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
. (C.17)
11see proof of Theorem C.6.
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Using Lemma C.5 and (C.17) (cf. (C.13)), we get that
⊢IPEL τai
k
→
©­­­­«
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=1
σ [aik ]
ª®®®®¬
∧
©­­­­«
∧
σA∈PSi
fσ (k)=0
¬σ [aik ]
ª®®®®¬
ª®®®®¬
. (C.18)
From (C.16) and (C.18), we deduce that
⊢IPEL τai
k
→ i (τc → τb ).
By axiom M2 (ip → p), we have
⊢IPEL τai
k
→ (τc → τb ),
which is equivalent to
⊢IPEL (τai
k
∧ τc ) → τb .
Since ⊢IPEL τc → τai
k
, the equation above implies that
⊢IPEL τc → τb .
This last equation is a contradiction since in A, the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of IPEL, we have that c  b.
Therefore, for every such pair b < c ≤ ai
k
, there exists a solution sb,c of Eai
k
such that (x i
b
)sb,c < (x ic )
sb,c . 
Lemma C.8. For every k ∈ ni , the system Eai
k
has a solution s , such that (x i
b
)s < (x ic )
s for all b, c ≤ ai
k
with b < c .
Proof. By Lemma C.7, for every pair b < c ≤ ai
k
there exists a solution sb,c of Eai
k
such that (x i
b
)sb,c < (x ic )
sb,c .
Notice that the solution space of Eai
k
is a convex subspace ofRl , for some natural number l . Indeed, it is immediate
that the solutions of each linear inequality define a convex space and the intersection of convex spaces is a
convex space (cf. [Lan13, Chapter 12]). Let n be the number of aforementioned solutions. Then it is the case that∑
b<c≤ai
k
1
n sb,c is also a solution of Eaik
(see e.g. [Lan13, Chapter 12, Theorem 1.2]). Let us call this solution s and
show that if d < e then (x i
d
)s < (x ie )
s .
Let d < e . Notice that, for every sb,c , it is the case that (x id )
sb,c ≤ (x ie )
sb,c by the restraints of the system Eai
k
.
Moreover, we have (x i
d
)sd,e < (x ie )
sd,e . Hence,
(x id )
s
=
∑
b<c
1
n
(x id )
sb,c <
∑
b<c
1
n
(x ie )
sb,c
= (x ie )
s
.
Therefore, we have that, for every pair d < e ≤ ai
k
, we have (x i
d
)s < (x ie )
s as required. 
For every agent i ∈ Agφ and every system Eai
k
, pick a solution s satisfying the conditions of Lemma C.8 and
define µi (b) = (x ib )
s , for every b ∈ Min(A⋆φ )↓. For agents j < Agφ , let µ j (b) = µB(b) (see (C.2)). Now, we define
an APE-model
Mφ = 〈A
⋆
φ , (µi )i ∈Ag,v〉 (C.19)
such that, for every p ∈ AtProp ∩ S♦φ , it holds that v(p) = p
A.
Lemma C.9. The modelMφ is an APE-model.
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Proof. For any i ∈ Agφ , the restrictions imposed by the systems of inequalities and the conditions of Lemma
C.8 immediately yield that µi is an i-measure. For j < Agφ , the only j-minimal element is ⊤. Furthermore, µB
is satisfies the restrictions of j-measures by definition. Hence, each µi is an i-measure, and by Lemma C.3 and
Definition 4.7 we have thatMφ is an APE-model. 
Lemma C.10 (Truth Lemma). For every ψ ∈ L such thatψA ∈ S♦φ , it is the case that
[[ψ ]]Mφ = ψ
A
.
Proof. By definition, S♦φ is closed under subformulas. The proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of
ψ . For the atomic variables, this follows immediately from the definition ofv . For formulas of the formψ ∧τ and
ψ ∨ τ this follows from the fact that A⋆φ inherits ∨ and ∧ from A. For formulas of the formψ → τ , ♦iψ and iψ
it follows from item 6 of Lemma C.2. Finally, for probability formulas of the form σ :=
∑
αmµi (ψm) ≥ β , notice
that, by the choice of µi as particular solutions of the systems Eai
k
, exactly the i-minimal elements ai
k
≤ σA are
such that
∑
αmµi ([[ψm]]Mφ ∧ a
i
k
) ≤ β . Hence, [[σ ]]Mφ = σ
A by definition (cf. Definition 5.6). This concludes the
proof. 
Proposition C.11 (Completeness). The axiomatisation for IPDEL given in Table 2 is weakly complete w.r.t.
APE-models.
Proof. As discussed in the beginning of this section, the problem is reduced to proving theweak completeness
of IPEL. Let φ be an IPEL formula that is not a theorem. This means that φA , ⊤A, where A is the Lindembaum-
Tarski algebra of IPEL (see (C.1)). By Lemma C.9, the modelMφ based on the algebra A⋆φ defined in (C.19) is an
APE-model. By Lemma C.10, [[φ]]Mφ = φ
A. Since ⊤A
⋆
φ = ⊤A, this shows that [[φ]]Mφ , ⊤
A
⋆
φ , which means that
Mφ does not satisfies φ as required. 
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